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Abstract
Despite the great achievements for peace and economic prosperity, the European project has recent- 
ly been challenged with public support being on decline in many member states, culminating in the 
decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU. Against this background, this study looks into ‘Euro- 
pean identity’ as a concept of fundamental importance for European integration. In the economic 
literature, ‘identity’ has been increasingly recognized as a crucial driver of individual behavior with 
joint group identities as a precondition for trustful cooperation. Hence, some type of European iden- 
tity (in addition to, not replacing national identities) can be regarded as one of the underlying pre- 
conditions for the European project.
Against this background, this study develops the contents and nuances of the ‘European identity’ 
terminology as distinct from other categories like EU support. It empirically describes ongoing trends 
and comprehensively summarizes the literature’s insights on the important determinants of Europe- 
an identity. On the basis of identified determinants and target groups a classification of measures to 
promote European identity is developed. This classification is based on the distinctions between a
‘civic’ and a ‘cultural’ European identity on the one hand and between the ‘input’ and ‘output legiti- 
macy’-creating function of potential measures.
Based on this classification and survey of possible approaches for the advancement of European 
identity we give a broad overview on possible approaches to foster European identity. We elaborate 
six proposals in more detail: transnational party lists, an EU Citizens’ Assembly, EU consular offices, 
Pensioners’ Erasmus, a ‘European Waltz’ program, and an EU public service broadcaster. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Conceptualizing European identity 
1. The study uses the concept put forward by Cram (2012) defining ‘European identity’ as ‘iden-
tification as European’. Additionally, we follow Bruter (2003) who distinguishes between a 
civic and a cultural component of European identity. In order to be able to relate policy pro-
posals to European identity, we further distinguish between categories of input and output 
legitimacy and develop a matrix that classifies possible identity-fostering approaches. 
2. We further distinguish between European identity and EU support. We conclude that Euro-
pean identity in contrast to EU support expresses identification instead of an opinion, and 
this is what we devote our study to. 
3. There are several ways to measure European identity, of which the most commonly used is 
the so called ‘Moreno’ question in the Standard Eurobarometer survey conducted by the Eu-
ropean Commission on a biannual basis.  
4. The general trend of Eurobarometer data on European identity shows significant variation 
both over time and across countries. However, the overall level was relatively stable over the 
last three decades. Interestingly, European identity seems on a rise in those countries where 
it is most controversially discussed recently, for instance in the UK and Hungary. 
Literature survey 
5. Individual-level factors seem especially powerful in explaining European identity: cognitive 
mobilization, transnational contact, socio-economic status (resources), and age have a signif-
icant impact on European identity. Moreover, trust and satisfaction with democracy seem 
decisive as well as a perceived cultural closeness and common values.  
6. However, there are significant country-level differences which remain unexplained. 
Empirical study: exploring determinants of European identity 
7. We use the most recent Eurobarometer survey from spring 2017 and add several country-
level variables and test their impact on European identity with a probit model. 
8. Individual-level factors: Our findings support the literature’s findings. We derive five areas of 
action or target groups from these results:  
1) Keep students and add pensioners 
2) Strengthen education and information (‘cognitive mobilization’) 
3) Foster travel and exchange (‘transnational contacts’) 
4) Tackle economic inequality for EU participation 
5) Foster reliability, citizenship, and similarity 
9. Country-specific factors: The general economic situation of a country in terms of its prosperi-
ty does indeed play a role, but affects European identity ambiguously. All in all, significant 
differences between member states remain with regard to European identity. However, 
there have not yet been identified meaningful categories to further qualify these differences. 
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Proposals on how to strengthen European identity 
10. This study attempts to gather and evaluate proposals to raise European identity. We present 
and discuss a broad range of policy proposals that aim at increasing European identity. In 
particular, we focus on six proposals: transnational party lists, an EU Citizens’ Assembly, EU 
consular offices, Pensioners’ Erasmus, a ‘European Waltz’ program, and an EU public service 
broadcaster. These can be motivated with respect to target groups and main mechanisms in 
the following way: 
1) Keep students and add pensioners: We propose to establish the Pensioners’ Eras-
mus program. 
2) Strengthen education and information (‘cognitive mobilization’): We propose to 
establish an EU public services broadcaster. 
3) Foster travel and exchange (‘transnational contacts’): We propose to establish the 
European Waltz program. 
4) Tackle economic inequality for EU participation: Building on the example from Ire-
land, we suggest to establish a Citizens’ Assembly at the EU level. The Assembly 
would gather people from all regions and socio-economic backgrounds and might, 
thereby, allow for a much broader assessment of perspectives on a political issue. 
Moreover, we took the issue of restricted personal financial means into account 
when designing the Pensioners’ Erasmus and the European Waltz program. 
5) Foster reliability, citizenship, and similarity: In order to increase the civic aspect of 
European identity we present the currently highly debated proposal to establish EU-
wide transnational party lists and the proposal to establish EU consular offices. 
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1. Introduction 
 
‘Identity’ as a person’s sense of self has increasingly been acknowledged to be of substantial im-
portance for economic behavior and economic outcomes. The way we see ourselves co-determines 
the subjective payoffs we receive from certain actions. Akerlof and Kranton even regard the choice of 
an identity as possibly “the most important ‘economic’ decision people make” (Akerlof and Kranton, 
2010, p. 717) since it may constrain an individual for a lifetime. Identity does not only shape individu-
al behavior but also the potential cooperation in groups and societies. A common identity within 
groups fosters mutual trust and cooperation (La Barbera and Ferrara, 2012). This dimension makes it 
a relevant concept also for the functioning of societies, be they of a national or supranational type. 
With these insights, it is not surprising that issues of ‘European identity’ have received large atten-
tion in the study of the European integration process as well. Similar to national identity being a cru-
cial driving factor for the emergence of the nation state, some type of European identity is seen as a 
precondition for the stable existence and further evolution of the European Union. Like for any other 
social group, identity of a European type would foster mutual trust of Europeans and, hence, simplify 
cooperation, the search for compromises and, hence, further integration steps. Conversely, if Euro-
pean identity is increasingly crowded out by strong and exclusive national feelings this might funda-
mentally threaten the achievements of the European integration process. 
Until well into the 2000s, there was the expectation that advancing European integration and Euro-
pean identity would reinforce each other in a virtuous loop: Advancing economic integration and 
convergence would make Europe increasingly visible and, hence, further foster European identity 
(Fligstein et al., 2012). This strengthened ‘sense of being a European’ would then promote cross-
border trust between European citizens and their governments which would overcome obstacles to 
further integration steps. 
The multi-crisis of European integration over the last decade has shattered this integration-optimism. 
The sequence of crises (financial crisis, euro area debt crisis with its new economic divergence, refu-
gee crisis, terroristic and external threats) has led, at least in some EU Member States, to a disap-
pointment and alienation from the European project. More and more, ’European identity’ is dis-
cussed as the increasingly missing piece to successful European policy making. The height of the crisis 
so far was the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU. Brexit is probably the most prominent 
example for the potential consequences of a fundamental lack of ‘feeling European’. Brexit can also 
be seen as an example where a specific identity of a part of the population (the ‘Brexiteers’ with their 
national identity in explicit demarcation from being European as well) can lead to decisions which 
seem to be irrational from the perspective of citizens with a different identity (the ‘Remainers’). Crit-
ics of Brexit who point to the potentially high economic costs of leaving the EU may simply miss a 
crucial point: For someone without any European identity, Brexit can be part of an individually opti-
mizing strategy even if it implies a somewhat lower economic standard of living.  
With this background, this study sheds light on strategies on how to advance a ‘European identity’. 
Based on an in-depth survey of the European identity literature and some descriptive analyses the 
study systematizes, assesses and develops possible approaches to advance the feeling as a European. 
To do so, two clarifications are important from the start: 
- This study is not about how to advance the reputation of EU institutions or to defend specific 
integration projects. It is essential to conceptually disentangle different categories: European 
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identity is a concept distinct from EU support or support for a particular EU institution or pol-
icy. Even citizens with an outspoken European identity may oppose a certain EU policy or be 
critical of a European institution. This opposition, in turn, can be an expression of a general 
EU objection but also simply a disagreement with the direction of the policy or an institution. 
For instance, it is essential to disentangle whether opposition to more fiscal insurance within 
the Eurozone is a matter of insufficient solidarity (referred to a lack of ‘European identity’) or 
simply a disapproval of this policy as promising problem-solving.  
- As an important note, we believe it should not be the objective of European politics let alone 
academic research to manipulate (‘nudge’) citizens to become ‘better Europeans’. Identity 
belongs to a person’s most private sphere and is up to own evaluations and decisions. How-
ever, it is a legitimate objective to study which type of policy measures might have implica-
tions for European identity. Especially in light of the recently increased voices against the in-
tegration project in general, it is essential to study the impact of policy measures on e.g. sat-
isfaction with democracy, participation in the EU project, and the socio-economic conditions. 
Furthermore, an important type of measures may advance European identity by overcoming 
biases in information and prejudices. This type of approach which is based on exchange and 
improved information cannot be seen as an undue manipulation of preferences. On the con-
trary, it advances rational decision making as an essential ingredient for a stable and fruitful 
democratic system and peaceful international cooperation.  
The study proceeds in the following steps: in section 2, we conceptualize our understanding of ‘Euro-
pean identity’ to distinguish different dimensions and to demark it from other concepts like EU sup-
port. We also shed some descriptive light on the evolution of European identity across time and in 
cross-country comparison. Subsequently (section 3), we review the literature on European identity 
and related concepts. The literature review will disclose and also summarize which relevant drivers 
have been identified. The next analytical step (section 4) is an explorative data analysis that further 
illuminates factors which are conducive to or detrimental for building up a European identity. The 
objective is to identify ‘target groups’ which could benefit most from specific types of policy 
measures to participate in the EU project – and thereby encourage the development of European 
identity. All these steps prepare the ground for section 5 that collects, classifies and evaluates strate-
gies to advance European identity. In particular, we will choose six measures to present in more de-
tail with a clear policy objective: transnational party lists, an EU Citizens’ Assembly, EU consular offic-
es, Pensioners’ Erasmus, a ‘European Waltz’ program, and an EU public service broadcaster. Section 
6 sums up the findings and provides some overall conclusions. 
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2. Conceptualizing European Identity  
 
2.1. Citizenship, Culture and the Individual 
The term ‘European identity’ can in general be described as a feeling of being European “as an inte-
gral part of one’s own social identity” (Hooghe and Verhaegen, 2017, p. 163)4. The attempts to con-
ceptualize European identity are vast and comprehensive (Friese and Wagner, 2002; Carey, 2002; 
Kaina, 2013, White, 2012; Kaina et al., 2016)5 and people might attach quite different meanings to 
‘being European’ (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Risse, 2010; Bayley and Williams, 2012; Lichten-
stein and Eilders, 2015; Banjac and Pušnik, 2015)6.  
In order to properly investigate European identity we need a meaningful and precise conceptualiza-
tion. Therefore, we follow Cram (2012; see also Kaina, 2013; Mitchell, 2015). Cram (2012) distin-
guishes between ‘identification as European’ and ‘identification with Europe’. The former refers to a 
more cognitive self-assessment towards specific ideas whereas the latter refers to more affective 
behavior that implicitly shows how honestly these ideas are ‘lived up to’. For Kaina (2013) this also 
refers to interactions of the individual with other group members, which creates a “sense of belong-
ing together” (Kaina, 2013, p. 189)7. Whereas ‘identification with Europe’ is a delicate task to meas-
ure, ‘identification as European’ can be rather easily assessed using surveys (see the discussion in the 
next section).  
In the following, we will concentrate on ‘identification as European’ for two reasons. Firstly, it de-
scribes what we seek to assess for the purpose of this approach: a general attachment towards Eu-
rope. For the sake of our contribution it is not relevant how intense this feeling is and to what extent 
it is reflected in everyday life behavior. It is rather relevant that there is a general positive feeling 
towards Europe that might provide a foundation for EU legitimacy, facilitate EU politics and integra-
tion and trigger a democratic engagement with EU issues. For this project, the more cognitive aspect 
in contrast to the more affective aspect as described above is essential. Secondly, ‘identification as 
European’ is more easily measurable and the Eurobarometer offers excellent access to respective 
data. 
However, even ‘identification as European’ can have different dimensions, for example, because 
‘European’ might not necessarily imply an attachment towards the ‘European Union’. For a finer-
grained approach we suggest the following matrix, which further specifies the identity dimension and 
already points to identity triggers (Table 1). The matrix has a 2 x 3 structure and will guide this study 
in developing and classifying different identity-activating measures (section 5). The vertical matrix 
dimension refers to the ‘civic’/’cultural’ distinction in the identity literature. The horizontal dimen-
                                                            
4  For a detailed discussion of the definition of identity, social and political identity see Kaina and Karolewski 
(2009) and Dehdari and Gehring (2017). 
5  Economic accounts of ‘identity’: Akerlof and Kranton (2010) consider the effect of social rules on rational 
behavior and Davis (2007) claims that the individual interacts with its social environment and that this 
may affect social rules. 
6  For a collection of research on the different meanings attached to ‘European identity’ and culture see: 
http://culturalbase.eu. 
7  Kaina (2013) distinguishes between the individual and the collective level of identity. An individual be-
longs to a group in two ways: firstly as a collective entity, and, secondly, as an interaction between group 
members. The individual belongs together with other group members, as a more personal interaction. 
Hence, identity with regards to a group works in two ways.  
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sion takes up the distinction between ‘input legitimacy’/’output legitimacy’ and, furthermore, the 
classical ‘polity’/’politics’/’policy’ terminology. 
 
Table 1: Conceptualizing matrix to classify identity-advancing measures. 
 Input legitimacy Output legitimacy 
 EU Polity 
(political system) 
EU Politics 
(political discourse) 
EU Policy 
(political measures, laws) 
Civic identity e.g. elect COM president e.g. Citizens’ Assembly  
Cultural identity   e.g. Erasmus 
Source: own set-up. 
‘Civic’ versus ‘cultural’ European identity: Bruter (2003) distinguishes between a civic and a cultural 
component of European identity. A European ‘civic identity’ refers to the perception to be part of a 
European political system or even a ‘European state’ that defines rules, laws and rights with rele-
vance for one’s own life. A focus on the civic dimension would largely equate ‘Europe’ with ‘Europe-
an Union’. A European ‘cultural identity’ is independent from these political perceptions and labels 
the perception that fellow Europeans are closer than non-Europeans because of shared culture, val-
ues or history. This distinction is important for the classification of identity-activating measures since, 
typically, both dimensions of identity can be triggered with different types of measures. For instance, 
Bruter (2003) finds that civic identity responds to news, whereas cultural identity rather responds to 
symbols.  
‘Input legitimacy’ versus ‘output legitimacy’: A sense of ‘legitimacy’ of the European project is con-
sidered to foster European identity. ‘Input legitimacy’ refers to the institutions and processes that 
lead to political decisions in Europe. Input legitimacy is advanced e.g. by a high degree of citizens’ 
involvement or the perception of an impartial European decision process. ‘Output legitimacy’ refers 
to resulting policies and measures and is supported by a good performance of European policies that 
deliver on the promises made to European citizens (distinction used by Hobolt, 2012a; Scharpf, 1999, 
also see discussion in The Oxford Handbook of the European Union8). 
‘Polity’, ‘politics’ and ‘policy’: In order to clearly assign policy measures, we further use the classical 
political science distinction of the ‘political’: polity, politics, policy9. The polity describes the political 
system, each body’s tasks and duties and how the different bodies relate. Politics summarize all the 
political debates, the process, that take place before deciding a legislation (or also afterwards to 
evaluate it). They happen in the parliament and within parties but also in public debates. The term 
describes the process when politicians interact with each other and the public. Thus, the polity and 
politics dimensions cover two distinct determinants of input legitimacy (i.e. the institutional side and 
‘government responsiveness’).  Finally, the term ‘policy’ refers to the ‘content’ and describes the final 
                                                            
8  In the Handbook, Schmidt (2012) also discusses ‘throughput legitimacy’, but for the sake of parsimony we 
constrain ourselves to the two mentioned forms of legitimacy. 
9  The distinction stems from Anglo-American political science but has also been firmly established in the 
context of the European Union and its member states (see The Oxford Handbook of the European Union). 
For an assessment of the Lisbon Treaty changes in that regard see Dosenrode (2016). For a German as-
sessment of the distinction see von Alemann (1994). 
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decisions that are taken. This refers to specific policy fields, such as social policy, foreign policy, or 
economic policy and finally determines to which extent the government provides value to its citizens 
and, thus, creates ‘output legitimacy’. 
 
2.2. EU Support versus European Identity 
A further conceptual clarification is needed for the terminological couple of ‘European identity’ and 
‘EU support’. Figure 1 gives a sketch about the relationship. The exact relationship between Europe-
an identity and support for the EU or (further) European integration is quite complex10 and not yet 
entirely clear as some areas remain under-researched until now. 
It is generally assumed that European identity is an indispensable element for a successful EU and 
any further integration (see (1) in the sketch). This has also been shown by experimental studies (La 
Barbera and Ferrara, 2012; La Barbera et al., 2014; La Barbera, 2015; for a discussion of European 
identity and the EU’s legitimacy see Kaina and Karolewski (2009) and Jones (2012)). However, empiri-
cal studies in this respect are scarce. Bayram (2017) gives an intriguing account of German politicians’ 
European identity and shows that it positively affects compliance with EU law. In turn, European 
integration also seems to have a positive effect on European identity formation (Luhmann, 2017; see 
(2) in the sketch). Moreover, European identity seems to drive attitudes towards particular EU poli-
cies and EU membership (La Barbera, 2015; Franchino and Segatti, 2017; Verbalyte and von Scheve 
2017; see (3) in the sketch) and, vice versa, EU support seems to positively affect European identity 
(Bruter, 2005, p. 124; Verhaegen et al., 2017; see (4) in the sketch). Verhaegen et al. (2017) show 
that EU support, measured as perceiving membership in the EU as good or neutral, also increases 
European identity significantly. Finally, EU support is considered to explicitly or implicitly ‘commis-
sion’ politicians to work towards further EU integration (Guiso et al., 2015; see (5) in the sketch). This 
shows that it is important to consider European identity, EU support, and actual European integra-
tion as conceptually different. 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between European identity, EU support and European integration. 
 
                                                            
10  To give an idea about the different meanings of these terms, the following statements are good examples:  
“I feel European but I reject the current make-up of the EU.” 
“I do not feel European but I consider the single market as economically useful.”  
“I feel European and I believe that much more integration is necessary, but not in the field of agricultural 
subsidies.” 
14 
 
Source: own set-up. 
Conceptually, European identity is widely described as being distinct from EU support as it expresses 
identification instead of an opinion. Moreover, it has an affective component and is perceived as 
rather durable and long-term oriented in contrast to an opinion. Furthermore, as identity is an in-
cremental part of a self, one might not always be aware of the ‘European identity component’ but 
only when it is triggered and referred to. Finally, as will be shown in the literature review below, 
while identity formation can be encouraged in a general sense through experiences, opinion for-
mation works rather through arguments and deliberation.  
In contrast, EU support is conceptually less clear. The term ‘EU support’ gathers several terms in the 
literature: support for the EU in general, for specific EU policies (e.g. the euro), or for EU membership 
as a proxy for the current level of EU integration, or opposition in the sense of Euroscepticism.11 
Some scholars consider support for the EU as the same as support for European integration (Henjak 
et al., 2012). However, European integration itself might have very different facets, similarly, related 
to substance and timing. In conclusion, while European identity refers to a rather general ‘entity’ 
such as the EU as a historical project, a broad geographical constituency or a large group of citizens 
of different member states, EU support can also refer to very specific aspects of the EU, such as spe-
cific policies, goals or tasks of the EU. Furthermore, considering EU support as an opinion, it might be 
more susceptible to change in general and might vary on a rather short- to medium-term basis.  
Despite the differences in concept, the below literature review will show that European identity as 
well as EU support are affected by similar factors. Moreover, as can be seen from the descriptive 
statistics, support for EU membership and European identity follow similar trends – especially recent-
ly with the crisis. We do not further investigate in the relationship between EU support and European 
identity. The aim of this study is to evaluate policy proposals to encourage European identity in the 
long-run, and not to raise a favorable opinion on what the EU is doing. Therefore, the following liter-
ature review will focus explicitly on European identity. Nevertheless, we will describe the named 
factors’ effects also on EU support in order to provide a comprehensive picture and try to assess the 
empirical similarities and differences of both. This is because the policy proposals that we will inves-
tigate will certainly also affect EU support and it might be good to have an impression to what extent 
and in what direction this might probably be the case. 
  
2.3. Measurements 
The most commonly used empirical measure for European identity is the so called ‘Moreno ques-
tion’12 in the standard Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2017):  
“In the near future, do you see yourself as  
(1) [nationality] only,  
(2) [nationality] and European,  
(3) European and [nationality] or  
(4) European only.”  
                                                            
11  For the sake of parsimony, we do not discuss Euroscepticism here. For a good recent overview see ifo 
DICE Report 04 (2017) and for a discussion of the relationship between Euroscepticism and European 
identity see Weßels (2007) and Fligstein et al. (2012). 
12  The question is named after sociologist Luis Moreno Fernández (1986), who first introduced such a ques-
tion to study sub-national identity of Scots with regard to Britain. 
15 
 
Its strength is that it allows for a dual (national and European) identity and also for an alternative 
ordering of national and European identity components. However, the question is contested with 
regard to the above mentioned conceptual distinction between identification as European and with 
Europe. Mitchell (2015) argues that the Moreno question only refers to the first and not the latter. 
Firstly, people could have different understandings of what ‘feeling European’ means (see also 
Bruter, 2003, p. 1154). Secondly, people could feel European (identify as European) but not quite act 
upon it (identify with Europe). Therefore, both aspects of identity do not necessarily evolve together. 
As our paper focuses on ‘identification as European’, we feel confident to use this question.13 More-
over, the subtleties of what ‘feeling European’ means for different people seem not relevant for our 
purpose. As we focus on a general understanding of ‘feeling European’ to back a broad perspective 
on EU politics, the Moreno question seems well suited in that regard.     
The Eurobarometer offers a wide range of questions to measure EU support, i.a. with regard to spe-
cific policies, overall perceived benefits from EU membership, and speed of EU integration. The most 
commonly used question, which we will also use here, is (European Commission, 2017): 
“Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European Union is a 
good thing, bad thing or neither good nor bad?” 
In the following we will look more closely at the development of the Moreno question and the EU 
membership question over the last decades. 
 
2.4. Eurobarometer Trends 
The literature is ambiguous on whether European identity increased over the last decades or not. 
While Bruter (2005) detects a slowly but substantive increase in European identity, Roose (2013) 
cannot find any particular trend. The following data presents the general trend of European identity 
and EU support from Eurobarometer data. A first glance shows that the overall level of European 
identity and EU support did not change significantly from the start until today. However, both vary 
significantly over time and across member states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
13  Bruter (2003) and Mitchell (2015) also argue that the question would imply “a (false) sense of hierarchy 
between national and European identities” (p. 332), however, we do not consider this a major problem of 
the question. Furthermore, Bruter (2003) considers it problematic to ask about “the near future” as this 
might create an “ambiguity between identity and prediction” (p. 1154). For a critical discussion of meas-
urements see Kaina and Karolewski (2009). 
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Figure 2: ‘Moreno’ question measuring European identity, 1992-2017, EU total. 
“In the near future, do you see yourself as …?” 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 1992-2017, Moreno question, weighted average according to Eurobarometer data for the ‘Europe-
an Union’ total. Own illustration, combination of data from Eurobarometer interactive and Eurobarometer 40 years re-
port14. 
  
                                                            
14  European Commission (2013, 2018a). Data for October 2004 was flawed due to an equally split dataset: 
the percentages added up only to 50%. Therefore, we multiplied the percentages by 2 to arrive at 100%. 
However, one has to keep in mind that the underlying dataset is only half as big as the others in the time 
series. 
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Figure 3: ‘Moreno’ question European identity, pre-/post-crisis difference (2005/2017). 
Source: Eurobarometer 2005 and 2017, Moreno question; ‘European’ as sum of all three answer options that include Euro-
pean identity as opposed to an exclusive national identity. Own calculation, simple delta between values for 2005 and 2017. 
2005 was the last data point before the crisis. 
European identity, on an aggregate level across the EU, has fluctuated in a stable range until 2010, 
the recent multi-crisis increased European identity markedly. Interestingly, the rise seems to have 
been started after the acute phase of the sovereign debt crisis for most countries under distress. 
Even more surprisingly, since the UK government’s decision to conduct a referendum on Britain’s 
membership in the EU, European identity rose to new record highs. This even coincides with rising 
discussions about the rule of law, freedom of the press and citizenship rights in Poland and Hungary. 
This is especially reflected in the comparison between pre- and post-crisis levels of European identity 
in all EU countries. Figure 3 shows the development of an exclusively national identity and the com-
bination of all three European identity related answer options of the Moreno question. In particular, 
in Hungary and the UK, European identity rose significantly. This indicates that the levels of European 
identity do not necessarily reflect the position of national governments towards specific EU issues – 
but instead, that an increased debate about those issues might have contributed to reflecting about 
one’s own identification as ‘European’. This is also supported by Ireland’s rising level of European 
identity. The country has high stakes in UK membership and close ties with the UK, not just economi-
cally but in particular emotionally, culturally and through history.  
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On the other end of the graph are Cyprus and Greece, and Italy and France. For the first two, this 
seems plausible with respect to the challenges that have been or still are accompanying the financial 
support programs. Italy and France struggle since long for kick starting economic growth, which often 
dominated domestic debates about the EU project. Among the countries with reduced levels of Eu-
ropean identity are Croatia and other still quite new member states.  
 
Figure 4: EU membership measuring EU support, 1973-2017, EU total. 
“Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the EU is …?” 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 1973-2017, EU membership question, weighted average according to Eurobarometer data for the 
‘European Union’ total. Own illustration, combination of data from Eurobarometer interactive and special Eurobarometer 
reports15. 
The overall level of EU support has not changed much since the mid-1990s. However, since then it 
trades clearly below its peak around 1990. Recently, there is a slight upward trend since 2012 for the 
EU aggregate. However, this only marks the starting levels from before the crisis. The crisis (2007 
until 2011) has reduced EU support. At first, this seems to relate especially to economic considera-
tions: Finland and Sweden as having been little affected by the crisis during this period are the only 
countries that report increases in EU support. Interestingly, the share of people who do not quite 
know what to think about EU membership has decreased significantly. This shows, that EU issues 
have risen in public attention and opinion building. All in all, the different descriptive findings indi-
cate that EU support is distinct from European identity. 
 
 
  
                                                            
15  European Commission (2018b) and European Commission and European Parliament (2013, 2015, 2017). 
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Figure 5: EU membership measuring EU support, pre-/post-crisis difference (2007/2011). 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 2007 and 2011, EU membership question. Own calculation, simple delta between values for 2007 
and 2011. The data for 2007 is from spring, hence, before the outbreak of the financial crisis in the US. 2011 is the most 
recent data point for individual countries. 
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3. Literature Survey: What Affects EU Support and European Identity? 
 
Considering that EU support and European identity are distinct concepts but closely linked, we will 
review the most recent literature16 on both. The following table summarizes the main findings. The 
first column names the main determinants (of European identity or EU support, respectively) that the 
literature identifies. These drivers may increase or decrease European identity and EU support – as 
reported by the following two columns. For instance, one might read it like this: “An improvement of 
the economic situation increases EU support”. The column ‘aspects’ names the ‘channels’ through 
which the determinant affects European identity and EU support. For instance, this could be the own 
economic situation but also the country’s one. As regards the categories of factors, we follow the 
distinction that Kaina and Karolewski (2009, p. 18) made but we further distinguish between country 
particularities and EU-wide developments. One methodological caveat is important: The existing 
contributions offer a wealth of insights that, however, can rarely be seen as evidence for a causal 
evidence. Rather than investigating in long-term developments, studies assess the current relation-
ship between factors. Often, the findings rather relate to significant correlations that could, for ex-
ample, be the result of some other unobserved individual characteristics.  
 
Table 2: Determinants of EU support and European identity. 
Determinants that impact 
on … 
… European 
Identity 
… EU Support Aspects 
Individual-level factors 
‘Cognitive mobilization’ increase  increase Both: higher education, better knowledge 
about the EU, information, interest, and 
discussing politics frequently 
Transnational contact increase increase Both: exchange with foreigners and living 
or working abroad, potential negative 
second-order effects of ‘social stratifica-
tion’ 
Personality traits and val-
ues  
increase increase European identity: optimism, extraversion, 
risk taking, liberal values, cosmopolitanism 
EU support: altruism, cosmopolitanism, 
multiculturalism, post-materialism 
National identity decrease decrease European identity: perceived to be com-
peting, pride 
EU support: perceived threat 
Regional attachment increase 
(political identity), 
decrease 
(cultural identity) 
increase  Both: cultural and political regional identi-
ty and attachment 
                                                            
16  For an excellent collection of articles on EU support see Kentmen Çin (2016) and Hobolt (2012b) and on 
European identity see Kaina and Karolewski (2009). 
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EU attitudes (support) increase --- European identity: specific salient policies 
Political attitudes (right) decrease --- European identity: positioning on the right 
of the left-right political spectrum 
Socio-economic situation increase increase European identity: wealth, occupation 
EU support: personal economic benefits or 
prospects 
Age decrease  --- 
Gender (male) increase  --- 
Regional/National particularities 
Economic situation  
(‘utilitarian hypothesis’) 
ambiguous increase European identity: benefits from EU, net 
contributors to EU budget 
EU support: own economic situation, per-
ceived or expected benefits for own re-
gion/country 
Quality of national institu-
tions  
ambiguous ambiguous European identity: trust in national institu-
tions, satisfaction with democracy 
EU support: bureaucratic efficiency, satis-
faction with democracy 
Elite in favor or in dispute  Increase 
(in favor) 
decrease 
(dispute) 
European identity: elite attachment 
EU support: disputes among elites, party 
identification, mass media 
EU-wide developments    
Trust in EU institutions increase  European identity: trust, satisfaction with 
democracy 
Common values increase  European identity: trust in EU citizens, 
perceived cultural closeness 
EU symbols increase  --- 
 
Firstly, there seems to be a difference between civic and cultural components of identity. This has 
been confirmed by a number of studies (Bruter, 2003, 2004, 2005; Harrison and Bruter, 2015; 
Brigevich, 2016; Verhaegen et al., 2017; Waechter, 2017). Bruter (2004) finds in focus group discus-
sions in France, the UK and the Netherlands that there is a clear distinction between the civic and the 
cultural dimension of European identity and that people are susceptive rather to either one of both 
than to both similarly. Most of the participants expressed a more ‘civic’ than ‘cultural’ perspective. 
Interestingly for the purpose of our study, both expressed clear signs of each component: “The imag-
es of Europe held by ‘cultural’ identifiers had to do with peace, harmony, the fading of historical divi-
sions and co-operation between similar people and cultures. The images of Europe held by ‘civic’ 
identifiers had to do with borderlessness, circulation of citizens, common civic area, new policy mak-
ing, and prosperity” (p. 36). Bruter describes these images as means for citizens “to anchor their 
sense of belonging” (p. 36). Moreover, the participants believe that “experiencing Europe would 
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make citizens feel more and more European” (p. 36) and suggest this relates to “travelling, living 
abroad” and an impact of EU level policies on the daily life (p. 36). Finally, Bruter also finds differ-
ences between the three countries relating to borderlessness experienced through Schengen. The 
participants from the UK lack this experience while the other two nationalities considered this “the 
best expression and foundation of their modern European identity” (p. 37). 
Starting with individual-level factors, undoubtedly, the four most significant sets of variables found 
by the literature are ‘cognitive mobilization’ (including education, knowledge, information, interest 
and discussing politics frequently), transnational contact as a means to broaden the personal horizon 
and understanding for different cultures, the socio-economic background, and, finally, age. It is gen-
erally summarized that those who are most likely to hold a European identity are young, wealthy, 
well-educated, and eager to travel, work or study abroad.  
As regards ‘cognitive mobilization’, several studies found that European identity increases with high-
er levels of education (Medrano and Gutiérrez, 2001; Jung, 2008; Risse, 2010; Ceka and Sojka, 2016; 
Mitchell, 2015; Verhaegen and Hooghe, 2015; Curtis, 2016; Westle and Buchheim, 2016; Verhaegen 
et al., 2017). Similarly, knowledge (Ceka and Sojka, 2016; Mitchell, 2015; Verhaegen and Hooghe, 
2015; Curtis, 2016) and information and news (Bruter, 2003; Waechter, 2016; Di Mauro and Fiket, 
2017) about the EU and politics increases the likelihood to develop a European identity. In particular, 
Harrison and Bruter (2015) examine the effect of news and symbols on both the civic and the cultural 
component of European identity and find a clear difference between both. News affect the first, 
whereas symbols affect the latter. Moreover, interest in EU issues (Verhaegen and Hooghe, 2015; 
Westle and Buchheim, 2016) as well as discussing about politics (Mitchell, 2015; Di Mauro and Fiket, 
2017; Verhaegen et al., 2017) also increases European identity. In contrast, Luhmann (2017) finds 
that cognitive mobilization is not a necessary condition for feeling European: those who discuss EU 
issues very often and not at all are equally likely to feel European, whereas those in the middle are 
less likely to feel European.  
Although these findings are intuitive and very plausible, they offer an example for the difficulties of 
causal identification in that literature. There remains the question of reversed causality or self-
selection: it needs some ‘pre-disposition’ to engage with EU matters and these are most likely to find 
with people who have a broad education and general interest in many issues. Two studies support 
this logic. Harrison and Bruter (2015) find that both components of identity are immediately affected 
by their treatments ‘news’ and ‘symbols’. However, the treatment effects unfold more in the long-
run than in the short-run. Furthermore, a pre-disposition seems decisive. This shows that identity 
evolves over time, contingent on preceding levels and treatment. Rünz (2015) finds that the ‘Model 
European Union’ (a European politics simulation exercise) in Strasbourg has a positive effect on Eu-
ropean identity and EU support. However, the effect is rather small due to the fact that the partici-
pants already had high levels of both European identity and EU support before. 
‘Cognitive mobilization’ is also supposed to increase EU support due to higher education, better 
knowledge about the EU, and discussing politics frequently (McLaren, 2002; Henjak et al., 2012).  
Transnational contact has been shown to be similarly influential on European identity (see the re-
view of respective EU programs by European Commission, 2012). This ranges from exchange with 
other Europeans (Rünz, 2015; Di Mauro and Fiket, 2017), travelling (Ceka and Sojka, 2016; Westle 
and Buchheim, 2016), personal transnational relations (e.g. being an intra-EU immigrant, Verhaegen 
et al., 2017) and relationships (Schroedter et al., 2015; Van Mol et al., 2015). Despite the fact that 
travelling has a positive effect on European identity, staying home and being exposed to a high num-
ber of tourists at home, does not show any effect on European identity (Buscha et al., 2017). Stoeckel 
(2016) studies international social interactions of about 1,500 German students and finds that con-
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tact increases European identity, particularly for those students who have had a rather weak Europe-
an identity before. Most prominently in this regard is the Erasmus (plus) program. The EU’s Erasmus 
Impact Study (European Commission, 2014, pp. 130 and 151) shows that mobile students and staff 
do in general feel more attached to Europe than non-mobile students and staff, even before going 
abroad. However, there is no ‘additional’ effect after having returned from the stay abroad. This 
leads to assume that it is less the exchange experience but the general interest in living abroad and 
getting to know other countries. However, this might also be a matter of opportunity and resources, 
as shown below under ‘socio-economic situation’. Jacobone and Moro (2015) find a small positive 
effect of participation in the Erasmus program on European identity – directly, and indirectly through 
a reduction in national and regional identity and increased cultural exchange confidence, language 
skills and personal development. Mitchell (2015) finds that participating in the Erasmus program 
indeed encourages European identity significantly. Oborune (2015) surveys about 12,000 Erasmus 
students and finds that about a third of them feels more European after the exchange. Finally, Bruter 
(2004) highlights the role of a feeling of ‘borderlessness’, especially through Schengen, and more 
generally with “travelling [or] living abroad” (p. 36). Kushnir (2016) supports this view and also con-
siders harmonizing policies such as the Bologna Process as part of a ‘delineation of borders’, which is 
perceived as contributing to forming a European identity. Summing up, Kuhn (2015) shows that 
transnational contacts contribute a lot to European identity formation. However, she also shows that 
only a small fraction of the population engages in this, namely young, well-educated and wealthy 
people (similarly Datler et al., 2005; Mitchell, 2015). 
As regards EU support, ‘transnational contact’ is supposed to reduce prejudices and to build trust in 
people from abroad (Kuhn, 2015). However, Kuhn (2015) shows that the probability of transnational 
contacts heavily depends on the individual’s level of education, and also the general level of wealth 
in their country. To sum up, it is resources, both in terms of economics and time that pave the way 
for visits and longer stays in other EU countries. Moreover, Kuhn emphasizes potential negative ef-
fects of ‘social stratification’: transnationalism which depends on the social background might even 
increase the distance between people who are a lot transnationally active and those who are not (or 
cannot) and, hence, endanger a European consensus.  
Thirdly, personality traits and values (incl. religion) seem to affect European identity. Curtis (2016) 
investigates how personality traits affect European identity in the UK. The study finds that extraver-
sion increases European identity, while agreeableness (in the sense of being gentle and polite) de-
creases it. Both can be seen as opposites in the sense of curiosity and openness to new things. In that 
sense, also risk aversion strongly decreases European identity. Luhmann (2017) finds that pessimists 
are a lot less likely to feel European. Postmaterialism (Jung, 2008) and cosmopolitan and liberal val-
ues (Risse, 2010) positively affect a supranational or European identity. Curtis (2016) also finds that 
adhering to Christian religion increases European identity. However, this could also simply be seen as 
a proxy for cultural closeness. Nelsen and Guth (2016) find that religion affects European identity: 
Catholics tend to be more European than Protestants. However, this only holds as long as the com-
munity is a majority in a country. As soon as Catholics and Protestants are minorities in their coun-
tries, the effect reverses and makes Protestants more inclined to European identity. However, this 
effect might actually hide a country specific effect as they do not control for country effects. 
As regards EU support, Pepermans and Verleye (1998) build on several social-psychological studies 
(especially Hewstone, 1986; Müller-Peters et al., 1998; Müller-Peters, 1998) and find that psychologi-
cal concepts allow to explain differences across countries on support for the euro. They conceptual-
ize the cultural differences along three dimensions (‘national economic pride and satisfaction’, ‘Self-
confident open-mindedness’, ‘Progressive non-nationalistic’). The attitudes towards the euro are 
shaped by these dimensions and by the potential threat that the euro could pose in that dimension 
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(or not). Moreover, altruism and cosmopolitanism (Bechtel et al., 2014), multiculturalism (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2005), and post-materialism (Gabel, 1998; McLaren, 2002) show to increase EU support. 
On national identity and regional attachment, Medrano and Gutiérrez (2001) find that both are 
compatible with European identity. However, Jung (2008) points out that national pride decreases a 
supranational identity. There seem to be different effects at work here. Ceka and Sojka (2016) for 
instance uncover that having a strong national identity decreases the cognitive component of Euro-
pean identity, but does not affect the affective component of European identity. Moreover, Westle 
and Buchheim (2016) discover that those who hold an exclusive European identity are mainly driven 
by rejecting their national identity. Capello (2018) emphasizes the proper targeting of EU cohesion 
policy in terms of matching local interests and, thereby, being able to promote European identity. 
Holding dear to a ‘national identity’ or perceiving others as a threat is commonly seen as restraining 
EU support (Carey, 2002; McLaren 2002, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Luedtke, 2005; Garry and 
Tilley, 2009). Meier-Pesti and Kirchler (2003) find that people who perceive their country as worse-
off than other countries in the EMU and who have high national pride, indeed think less of the euro 
than those who see their country at least equally or better-off.  
Dehdari and Gehring (2017) find that in Alsace and Lorraine a strong regional identity also relates to a 
high European identity. This holds especially for the first two generations after World War II. More 
importantly though, the authors find that “in line with the rejection-identification hypothesis, people 
in the treated area which experienced a change in nation-status and were exposed to repressive 
homogenization policies express a stronger regional identity and support more regional autonomy 
today” (p. 0). Even though this “threat to group identity” (p. 2) refers to national politics, this leads to 
assume that the EU is well advised to avoid similarly ‘repressive homogenization policies’ and giving 
the impression of a de facto ‘change in nation-status’ due to a supremacy of EU interests. Brigevich 
(2016) sheds further light on the relationship between regional and European identity in French re-
gions. In fact, she finds that cultural regional identity reduces support for EU institutions, whereas 
political regional identity increases support. This supports Dehdari’s and Gehring’s (2017) conclusion 
that people might seek to ‘up-level’ (national) political power to the EU so as to increase regional 
relevance. 
This also relates to the impact of attitudes, namely support, for the EU in general or for specific poli-
cies, on European identity. As sketched above, this is supposed to increase European identity. Ver-
haegen et al. (2017) show that EU support measured as perceiving membership in the EU as good or 
neutral also increases European identity significantly. Waechter (2016) supports the idea of per-
ceived political benefits, as they show that minority groups seem to especially appreciate the EU’s 
efforts for minority rights, which increases European identity – as the EU level responsibly and effec-
tively takes care of the political issues they perceive important. 
Moreover, political attitudes seem to affect European identity. Positioning oneself on the right of the 
left-right political spectrum is associated with low European identity (Jung, 2008; Curtis, 2016). How-
ever, this might actually show extreme right-wing attitudes that correspond to nationalistic attitudes 
than with moderate left and right-wing political attitudes. 
The individual socio-economic background and situation seem especially decisive for European iden-
tity (Risse, 2010). In fact, this might correlate with education and reflect a missing access to EU-wide 
exchange and knowledge. Verhaegen and Hooghe (2015) find that perceived personal economic 
benefits (‘utilitarian hypothesis’) increases European identity. Waechter (2016) shows that also for 
minority groups in the EU, the socio-economic situation and perceived or expected benefits from the 
EU drive European identity formation.  
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As regards EU support, personal economic benefits or prospects positively affect EU support (Gabel, 
1998; Meier-Pesti and Kirchler, 2003; McLaren, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Maier and 
Rittberger, 2008; Chacha, 2012; Henjak et al., 2012; Guerra, 2013). For the crisis, Braun and 
Tausendpfund (2014) show that support for the EU declined since 2007 in all member states and find 
that a particularly negative personal perception of the crisis decreased EU support. Fligstein (2009) 
argues that trade integration has specifically benefited the well-educated, high-skill, transnationally 
working population. This reflects the standard picture of the globalization’s winners and losers. He 
adds a third group, the middle-class, who seems mainly positive towards the EU but might swing in 
critical moments. 
In terms of resources, the literature also names foreign language proficiency as an important asset 
to engage in transnational contact for instance, or in knowledge or debating politics, and in turn, 
European identity (Fuss et al., 2004). Stoicheva (2015) stresses the role of multilingualism for Euro-
pean identity, both as a means to communicate and enter into exchange with people from other EU 
countries.  
As said above, age has been confirmed in the literature as a major determinant of European identity 
(Risse, 2010). However, this seems to relate to a cohort rather than an age effect on the one hand 
and is also linked to expectations and individual economic prospects as well as past experiences. As 
regards the first aspect, Jung (2008) finds that across the world, young people tend to have higher 
levels of supranational identity than people at older ages. The study shows that this is less a genera-
tional but rather a life-cycle effect leading the author to conclude that the openness during the 
young age is especially susceptive towards developing traits or attitudes that are positively associat-
ed with supranational identity. Secondly, Ceka and Sojka (2015) differentiate between cognitive and 
affective European identity. They observe that the effect of age has opposing effects in old and new 
member states. While in old member states, cognitive European identity increases with age, the op-
posite shows for new member states. As concerns affective European identity, young people from 
new member states are even more affective than their peers from old member states. Waechter 
(2017) links the generational effect to the numerous opportunities that the EU provides for young 
people regarding travelling, studying and working abroad.  
There are some studies on European identity formation among children, which support many of the 
above mentioned findings. Agirdag et al. (2012, 2016) investigate European identity formation 
among Belgian pupils and find that the socio-economic status, both of the child’s family as well as the 
overall school’s average, strongly affect European identity: children from working class families are 
less likely to identify as European. Moreover, boys identify more as European than girls. In contrast, 
neither age nor religion affect European identity during childhood. Savvides and Faas (2016) compare 
a state and a European school in the UK and find that personal and family links to European countries 
are particularly important for developing a European identity.  
Finally, for the individual-level factors, gender seems to have a small but significant effect on Euro-
pean identity, which remains unexplained in the literature. Male persons are more likely to have a 
European identity than female persons (Jung, 2008; Verhaegen and Hooghe, 2015) and also higher 
levels of EU support (Henjak et al., 2012). 
With regard to the national-level factors the role of a good economic situation and the quality of 
national institutions are rather ambiguous. Instead, a positive impact on European identity seems to 
stem from a general perceived benefit from the EU and satisfaction (=good experiences) with democ-
racy.  
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A favorable economic situation as such does not affect European identity. Instead, on the one hand, 
it is the country’s perceived benefit from the EU (Ceka and Sojka, 2016). On the other hand, a coun-
try’s good economic situation could also refer to decreased European identity if that means that it 
has to share some of its benefits. Westle and Buchheim (2016) find a slightly negative effect of net 
contributors to the EU budget to European identity. Isernia et al. (2012) test a series of factors to 
explain variation in European identity across time and member states. Interestingly, they find that 
higher national governance quality (measured by The World Bank’s (2018) indicator) reduces Euro-
pean identity. This might hint to the hope for the EU to have a positive impact on democratic values 
and the rule of law.  
However, the relationship between trust in national institutions and European identity is not that 
straightforward. In contrast to Isernia et al. (2012), Verhaegen and Hooghe (2015) find that trust in 
national institutions increases European identity. Moreover, a high satisfaction with democracy at 
the national and at the EU level also increases European identity (Verhaegen et al., 2017).  
As regards EU support, the effect of the quality of national institutions is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, people living in countries with little corruption and efficient bureaucracies transmit this expe-
rience into respective expectations towards the EU, thereby, increasing EU support (Hobolt, 2012a, 
who studies satisfaction with EU democracy). On the other hand, people living in countries with more 
corruption and less efficient bureaucracies hope for a positive effect of the EU on domestic rule of 
law and democratic development (Guiso et al., 2015; similar conclusion by Schukkink and Niemann, 
2012). In general, satisfaction with democracy increases EU support (Henjak et al., 2012; Maier and 
Rittberger, 2008). 
Finally, a country’s elite attachment towards the EU seems to positively affect European identity 
(Ceka and Sojka, 2016). As regards EU support, elites being a source of information for people, dis-
putes among elites reduce EU support (especially for those who feel exclusively national) (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2005). Similarly, political parties provide orientation through party identification (Stoeck-
el and Kuhn, 2017). Maier and Rittberger (2008) conduct an experimental survey and find that expo-
sure to mass media significantly drives support of EU enlargement. 
With regard to the EU-level factors, trust in EU institutions, democracy and other Europeans as well 
as EU symbols (Bruter, 2003; Harrison and Bruter, 2015) seem to increase European identity. This 
relates to both, civic and cultural identity and has a strong unifying impact. 
Overall, trust in EU institutions and EU democracy has a positive impact on European identity (Ceka 
and Sojka, 2016; Verhaegen et al., 2017). Verhaegen et al. (2017) find that both trust in EU institu-
tions as well as trust in other European citizens positively affects European identity. Westle and 
Buchheim (2016) study the changes from exclusive national to dual European and from dual Europe-
an to exclusive European identity. They show that both changes depend especially on factors related 
to the civic component of European identity: satisfaction with EU democracy, trust in EU institutions, 
EU citizens, and EU politics. Moreover, the ‘opposite’, having trust only in national institutions and 
citizens, reduces European identity significantly.  
As said above, trust in other EU citizens as well as common values positively affect European identi-
ty. Waechter (2017) shows that perceiving one’s own culture as similar to European also increases 
European identity for minority groups in Lithuania. Alesina et al. (2017) imagine the EU in terms of an 
“optimal political area” (p. 2) “in which diversity is sufficiently small” (p. 3). They study cultural values 
between 1980 and 2008 (religiosity, sexual morality, gender equality, role of the state and cultural 
capital). They find that views held among people across the EU area as diverse as in the US and that 
GDP growth (that might be associated with EU membership success) did not translate into conver-
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gence of views on basic values and attitudes. Perceiving cultures being similar also increases EU sup-
port (Maier and Rittberger, 2008). 
In conclusion, differences in European identity across countries remain large, ranging from Latvia 
(low) to Italy (high level of European identity) (Verhaegen and Hooghe, 2015; also Bruter, 2004). Re-
search finds differences especially among old and new member states (Ceka and Sojka, 2016). 
Scheuer and Schmitt (2009) relate this divide to lower levels of mutual trust. In contrast, Verhaegen 
et al. (2017) find that in general the number of years of EU membership does not affect European 
identity. Despite the fact that Buscha et al. (2017) did not find any effect of the introduction of the 
euro on European identity, they show that euro member states have higher levels of European iden-
tity than non-euro-member states – even before the introduction of the euro. 
As regards EU support, Pepermans and Verleye (1998) detect ‘cultural differences’ between south-
ern, central, northern and Scandinavian countries. Guiso et al. (2015) see a clear distinction between 
northern and southern countries for EU support, that partly relates to the level of unemployment 
and interest rate spreads of sovereign bonds (with respect to the German Bund). Chiciudean and 
Corbu (2015) show that Romanian people are among those in the EU with the most positive attitudes 
towards the EU. They conclude that this is because of high deception towards their own country and 
government, leading them to turn their hopes towards the EU. 
Summing up, individual-level factors seem especially powerful in explaining European identity: cogni-
tive mobilization, transnational contact, socio-economic status (resources), and age have a significant 
impact on European identity. Moreover, trust and satisfaction with democracy seem decisive as well 
as a perceived cultural closeness and common values. However, there still remain significant country-
level differences unexplained. Figure 6 seeks to illustrate the effect of the different factors on Euro-
pean identity.  
 
Figure 6: Determinants of European identity. 
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With the purpose of this study lying on gathering and evaluating policy proposals to enhance Euro-
pean identity, the literature review helps to identify recommendations for promising ‘target groups’: 
- Cognitive mobilization: Target those who are less educated and have less general knowledge 
of the EU and politics; increase the level of quality information and news on EU issues; en-
courage debates about EU issues (in relation to individual’s politically salient issues). 
- Transnational contact: Target those who have not yet sufficient resources and opportunities 
to engage in transnational contact both at home and abroad (especially regarding financial 
resources, language skills, and time); learn from positive experiences with the Erasmus pro-
gram. 
- Socio-economic situation: Target those who have not yet sufficient resources especially to 
encourage ways to engage in transnational contact and cognitive mobilization. 
- Age: Targeting elderly people seems especially urgent, as well as adults that do not yet bene-
fit from Erasmus+ programs. 
- Trust in EU institutions, satisfaction with democracy: Increase knowledge and information, 
and offer opportunities for substantial and fruitful citizen engagement; enforcement of the 
EU’s rule of law mandate. 
- Cultural closeness and common values: Increase knowledge and exchange, encourage re-
sources for communication (especially language skills). 
Before developing and evaluating proposals on how to target the above mentioned aspects and en-
courage European identity, we test empirically whether these aspects hold for the current European 
‘state of mind’. The data base is the most recent Eurobarometer from March 2017. 
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4. Exploring European Identity: Individual and Country-Specific De-
terminants  
 
With the following empirical study we aim to verify some of the literature’s main correlations for 
European identity for the most recent data in the European Union. The goal is to confirm target 
groups that currently have little European identity. Additionally, we try to shed more light on the two 
components of identity, namely the civic and the cultural component. This shall help to tailor the 
proposals in section 5 to encourage European identity especially for those target groups. The same 
caveat applies that is relevant for much of the literature: our regressions can detect the existence of 
multivariate statistical correlations but these results do not prove causality over time. In order to get 
insights on the actual process of developing a European identity from no or lower levels to higher 
levels of European identity, one would need to study changes in identity. This could only be done 
using actual or experimental panel data (see for one of the rare examples Westle and Buchheim, 
2016) and must be left to future research. 
 
4.1. Data and Methodology 
 
We use the most recent Eurobarometer data, the survey from Spring 2017 (European Commission, 
2017). Following the literature, we use the ‘Moreno’ question on European identity as presented in 
section 2.2. We code the answer as a dummy, where ‘1’ indicates all the answer options that name 
European as either first or secondary identity. Building on the extensive literature presented above, 
we use three categories of independent variables and amend them by some further variables that we 
consider promising: (1) individual-level characteristics, (2) personality and attitudes and (3) country-
specific factors. Appendix A lists each variable with summary statistics and the coding scheme. 
Regarding the first set of variables, we include age, gender, whether a person has more than one 
nationality (‘multiple nationalities’), whether a person currently lives in another EU country than 
their nationality (‘intra-EU migrant’), whether the own economic situation is perceived as good (=‘1’), 
education17, and occupation18. Furthermore, we include whether a person lives in a large city as this 
could generally increase openness towards other cultures and world views. Secondly, we include a 
variable that measures whether a person currently lives with children in a household19. We expect 
that these people might be in general more forward looking and might tend to care a bit more about 
politics. Retired people are overly represented in the dataset, which is why we later include a dummy 
specifically for them. Similarly, students turned out to be very significantly related to European iden-
tity, which is why we also include a separate dummy for them. Both correlate highly with the varia-
bles ‘age’ and ‘occupation’, which is why we exclude these variables in the following analysis.  
                                                            
17  The Eurobarometer does neither capture the level of education nor the number of years in education. We 
approximate the latter by using the question “How old were you when you stopped education” and sub-
tracting by 5 (hypothetical schooling age). 
18  We group the many answer options of the latter in five categories: employed, self-employed, unem-
ployed, student, and retired. 
19  The Eurobarometer does not assess whether a person has children. Therefore, we approximate this by 
using the question whether a person currently lives with children in a household. Even though this ignores 
other people who have children (with whom they do not live together anymore), for instance pensioners, 
the effect turns out to be small but very robust. 
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The second set of variables focuses on personal characteristics, general and EU attitudes in particu-
lar. Following the literature, we include variables on knowledge about the EU, discuss EU politics 
frequently, having travelled in another EU country in the past 12 months, having socialized with peo-
ple from other EU countries (‘exchange’), altruism, and optimism. Moreover, we include attachment 
to one’s region and the personal evaluation whether the current economic situation of one’s country 
is good (=‘1’). The literature was not yet entirely clear about the effect of positioning oneself on the 
left-right political spectrum. We follow Verbalyte and von Scheve (2017) and Henjak et al. (2012) and 
we do not include the entire scale but only the extremes. Whereas there is no reasonable hypothesis 
upon being rather left or right oriented, there is popular conviction that being on the extreme right 
relates to a rejection of the EU and European identity. However, we do not yet know how the ex-
treme left feels about European identity. As regards EU attitudes, we first include a variable that 
measures the person’s perceived purpose of the EU. Here, we use the question ‘What creates a feel-
ing of community among EU citizens?’. We code the three most relevant aspects for our context, 
which are ‘culture’, ‘economics’, and ‘the rule of law’. This shall help to shed light on the different 
components of European identity and whether it is rather a cultural or a civic perspective, or, again 
different a rational economics perspective. Additionally, we include two variables that aim to meas-
ure the cultural component: whether a person thinks that people from different EU member states 
share values, and whether the EU poses a threat to one’s own culture. As regards the civic compo-
nent, we include two variables measuring the relative levels of trust in the EU and satisfaction with 
the EU in comparison to one’s country20. Finally, we include two variables measuring EU support 
today (‘the EU is going in the right direction’) and in the future (‘More EU integration is needed’). 
With regard to the third set of variables, we first include country dummies and then try to specify 
country-level characteristics using the unemployment rate as a proxy for the current economic situa-
tion (Eurostat, 2018), the KOF globalization index (Gygli et al., 2018) as a proxy for EU economic inte-
gration21 and a variable indicating the amount of net contributions to the EU budget (European 
Commission, 2018d). The latter has been used in the literature already showing a negative effect on 
European identity. We include the variable both as a dummy and measuring broad levels so as to 
allow more variation. Finally, we include established groups of countries according to the literature: 
whether a member state is a new member to the EU, the size according to the vote shares in the 
Council of ministers22, and the geographical location. Even though the latter has not a proper ‘quali-
ty’ but is just a geographical location, it helps us to group countries and, thereby, to allow for varia-
tion while avoiding multi-collinearity with country dummies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
20  Here, we computed a variable that subtracts the national evaluation from the EU evaluation. The aim is to 
shed light on the literature’s accounts and whether people do indeed ‚up-level’ hopes for the rule of law 
and democracy. 
21  Unfortunately, the most recent available data for the EU economic integration index by König and Ohr 
(2013) is from 2012.  
22  We defined three groups: large, medium, and small. We classified countries according to the vote shares 
distribution in the Council (Protocol 36 to TFEU, Art. 3, amended by Croatia’s accession Treaty, Art. 20):  
27 and 29 votes as large, 10-14 votes as medium, and 3-7 votes as small. 
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4.2. Empirical Exploration 
 
Table 3 shows the first two models that include the first and second set of individual variables as 
described above. Additionally, both include country fixed effects23. The estimation coefficients re-
ported here are marginal effects and can be interpreted as change in the probability that the re-
spondent reveals a European identity. We discuss both the magnitude of the effect and the statistical 
significance as illustrated by the asterisks. 
 
Table 3: Probit model on European identity (with country fixed effects). 
 
Model (1) (Baseline) Model (2) (... Attitudes) 
     
Age (in years) -0.00369*** 
 
 
(0.000705) 
 Student 
 
0.226*** 
  
(0.0383) 
Retired 
 
-0.0378* 
  
(0.0203) 
Female -0.112*** -0.0586*** 
 
(0.0160) (0.0171) 
Children  0.0617*** 0.0520*** 
 
(0.0180) (0.0189) 
Multiple nationalities 0.108 0.0248 
 
(0.0706) (0.0742) 
Intra-EU migrant 0.641*** 0.500*** 
 
(0.0647) (0.0689) 
Living in a large town 0.111*** 0.0353* 
 
(0.0184) (0.0195) 
Own financial situation (good=1) 0.325*** 0.0489** 
 
(0.0181) (0.0202) 
Education (in years) 0.0741*** 0.0471*** 
 
(0.00253) (0.00271) 
Occupation (baseline: employed) – retired -0.0446* 
 
 
(0.0254) 
 Occupation – self-employed 0.0739** 
 
 
(0.0324) 
 Occupation – student 0.293*** 
 
 
(0.0405) 
 Occupation – unemployed 0.107 
 
 
(0.120) 
 Knowledge (highest=3) 
 
0.121*** 
  
(0.00985) 
Discuss (often=2) 
 
0.187*** 
  
(0.0135) 
Travelling (often=2) 
 
0.134*** 
  
(0.0134) 
Exchange (often=2) 
 
0.195*** 
                                                            
23  The model correctly predicts 72.48% of all cases. While the positive rate for European identity=1 is very 
high (82.48%), the rate of false positives for actually negative cases (European identity=0) is quite high 
(42.44%). 
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(0.0119) 
Altruism 
 
0.0569*** 
  
(0.0170) 
Optimism (-2 to 2, highest =2) 
 
0.105*** 
  
(0.00772) 
Regional Attachment (-2 to 2, highest =2) -0.0429*** 
  
(0.00924) 
Country's economic situation (good=1) 
 
0.0892*** 
  
(0.0213) 
Extreme Left 
 
-0.103*** 
  
(0.0312) 
Extreme Right 
 
-0.131*** 
  
(0.0342) 
EU purpose (baseline: other) – culture 
 
0.311*** 
  
(0.0242) 
EU purpose – economics 
 
0.363*** 
  
(0.0240) 
EU purpose – rule of law 
 
0.487*** 
  
(0.0364) 
Relative trust in EU (-2 to 2, EU more than nat. government=2) 0.0566*** 
  
(0.00867) 
Relative satisfaction with EU democracy (-4 to 4, EU more than nat.=4) 0.0163** 
  
(0.00809) 
EU threat to own culture  
 
-0.219*** 
  
(0.0251) 
EU people share values (-2 to 2, agree=2) 
 
0.152*** 
  
(0.00812) 
More EU integration (-2 to 2, agree=2) 
 
0.0960*** 
  
(0.00705) 
EU support (-1 to 1, agree=1) 
 
0.0741*** 
  
(0.0108) 
Constant -0.905*** -1.434*** 
 
(0.0661) (0.0654) 
   Includes country fixed effects yes yes 
   Observations 28,007 28,007 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All variables that are not further specified are dummies or start ranging from 0. 
 
Our analysis confirms many of the literature’s findings. We discuss all findings with a special focus on 
target groups. Firstly, it becomes obvious, that students are overwhelmingly more likely to have a 
European identity than other people. In contrast, retired and older people are less likely to have a 
European identity. In terms of occupation, self-employed people are more European than employed 
people. Interestingly, the coefficient for unemployed people is insignificant. This seems to contradict 
a ‘blame shifting’ mechanism and considering European identity as a result of one’s own economic 
situation. In contrast, however, perceiving one’s own economic situation as well as one’s country’s 
one as good indeed increases the likelihood of European identity. However, the magnitude of the 
effect is reduced considerably after including variables on personality and attitudes. Being female, for 
some reason, has a smaller but negative and robust effect. This indicates that there is a particular 
gender effect which is not taken up by the broad set of other control variables. As expected, ‘having 
children’ has a positive, yet smaller, effect.  
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Having more than one nationality as such does not increase the likelihood to have a European identi-
ty. The usually assumed effects surrounding this characteristic are probably taken up by some other 
variables. For instance, being an intra-EU migrant increases the likelihood significantly. This supports 
the transnational contact hypothesis. Similarly, ‘travelling’ and ‘exchange’ have significant positive 
effects. Our results also support the ‘cognitive mobilization’ hypothesis: education, knowledge and 
discuss all have positive effects. Furthermore, our results support Luhmann (2017) who showed that 
personality also affects the likelihood to have a European identity: altruism and optimism have a 
positive effect. Moreover, regional attachment has a negative effect similar to what Brigevich (2016) 
showed. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer does not distinguish between a cultural and a civic at-
tachment. Positioning oneself at either of the extreme ends of the political spectrum decreases the 
likelihood to have a European identity with no substantial difference between far left and far right. 
One of the most interesting findings is that the variable ‘EU purpose’ has positive effects for all of the 
three aspects that are interesting for our approach (see Figure 7). Moreover, ‘rule of law’ seems to 
have the most pronounced effect, much more than ‘culture’ and ‘economics’. This leads us to as-
sume that the rule of law plays an important role for European identity. Similarly, relative trust in the 
EU and relative satisfaction with EU democracy have a positive effect. Furthermore, culture plays an 
important role as well. While perceiving the EU as a threat to one’s own culture significantly reduces 
the likelihood to have a European identity, the likelihood increases when perceiving EU people to 
share values. Finally, also the support of the general political direction of the EU (‘EU support’) and 
advocating for more EU integration has a positive effect on European identity. 
Figure 7: Predicted probabilities of European identity for stated ‘EU purpose’ (with 95% confidence 
intervals). 
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In order to investigate a bit more into country-level factors, we ran model (2) with different sets of 
variables. For reasons of visibility, we do not report the individual-level factors in the following table 
but they remain part of the regression. Table 4 presents the results24.
                                                            
24  The final model (9) correctly predicts 72.00% of all cases. This is slightly less than model (2). While the 
positive rate for European identity=1 is very high (82.13%), the rate of false positives for actually negative 
cases (European identity=0) is quite high (43.14%). 
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Table 4: Probit model on European identity (with country-specific variables). 
 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
       Unemployment rate (grouped, 0 to 3) 0.00732 
     
-0.00398 
 
(0.00758) 
     
(0.0111) 
EU Budget net contribution (grouped, -2 to 2) -0.0543*** 
      
 
(0.00639) 
      KOF Globalization index (grouped, 0 to 3) 0.0909*** 
     
0.144*** 
 
(0.00983) 
     
(0.0129) 
Country group size (baseline: large) – medium 
 
-0.103*** 
   
-0.157*** -0.258*** 
  
(0.0218) 
   
(0.0233) (0.0253) 
Country group size (baseline: large) – small 
 
-0.297*** 
   
-0.288*** -0.329*** 
  
(0.0219) 
   
(0.0278) (0.0332) 
New member state 
  
-0.0199 
  
-0.0750 0.0698 
   
(0.0179) 
  
(0.0538) (0.0617) 
EU Budget net payer 
   
-0.0665*** 
 
-0.179*** -0.257*** 
    
(0.0188) 
 
(0.0347) (0.0362) 
Country group geo (baseline: core) – east 
    
-0.118*** -0.0837 -0.0335 
     
(0.0247) (0.0639) (0.0696) 
Country group geo (baseline: core) – Scandinavia & north 
   
-0.434*** -0.363*** -0.323*** 
     
(0.0268) (0.0287) (0.0295) 
Country group geo (baseline: core) – south 
    
0.0881*** 0.0156 0.139*** 
     
(0.0289) (0.0392) (0.0482) 
Constant -1.265*** -1.040*** -1.103*** -1.097*** -1.135*** -0.945*** -1.166*** 
 
(0.0491) (0.0467) (0.0461) (0.0457) (0.0500) (0.0604) (0.0635) 
        Includes individual-level variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        Observations 28,007 28,007 28,007 28,007 28,007 28,007 28,007 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All variables that are not further specified are dummies or start ranging from 0. 
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The table shows that, interestingly, the actual economic situation (‘unemployment rate’) does not 
play a role on top of the perceived economic situation discussed above. However, the general eco-
nomic situation of a country in terms of its prosperity does indeed play a role. Framing it as net con-
tributions to the EU budget shows a significant negative effect across all the models. Similarly, the 
more economically integrated in the world (‘KOF globalization index’), the higher the likelihood to 
have a European identity. This supports the findings by Luhmann (2017). While the dummy for new 
member states has no effect on European identity, interestingly, the size of countries does. This ef-
fect comes on top of economic integration and prosperity. Therefore it is difficult to meaningfully 
interpret this result. Being from a medium sized or small member state reduces the likelihood to 
have a European identity significantly in comparison to being from a large member state. Finally, the 
geographical country groups show a significant north-south divide: While people from northern 
countries (Scandinavia, the UK, and Ireland) are significantly more reluctant towards a European 
identity than people from the core countries, people from southern countries are significantly more 
likely to have a European identity. Interestingly, people from Eastern countries are on average unde-
cided: the significance of the effect is not robust across specifications.  
 
 
4.3. Results and Discussion 
 
Figure 8 summarizes the effects of all variables based on model (9). The individual-level variables’ 
estimates remained the same for models (3) to (9), except ‘living in a large city’ lost significance.  
Figure 8: Marginal effects of each independent variable (model (9)). 
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All in all, our findings support the literature’s findings. We can draw from this to specify the above 
described target groups: 
1. Keep students and add pensioners: Students show to be the frontrunners of European identi-
ty, in contrast to retired people. This speaks for continued support for the frontrunners and 
new support for encouraging pensioners to explore the EU. Even though women showed to 
be significantly less likely to have a European identity than men, women overwhelmingly par-
ticipated in Erasmus programs for instance, hence, before trying to target women, the rea-
sons for the effect have to be understood and studied in much greater depth. 
2. Focus on education and information (‘cognitive mobilization’): Even though the effect for 
knowledge and education is small, it is positive and significant. The effect of education might 
have also been taken up by the variable ‘students’. Moreover, the effect for discussing is pos-
itive and rather large. This supports the overwhelmingly positive evaluations of these factors 
in the literature and speaks for focusing on them in particular for encouraging European 
identity.  
3. Travel and exchange (‘transnational contacts’): Both variables as well as ‘intra-EU migrant’ 
shows to be significantly positively related to European identity. This supports the literature’s 
findings and speaks for enhancing this as a means to encourage interest, understanding, and 
‘friendship between nations’. This could also help to reduce the negative effect of regional 
attachment. 
4. Economics all over or not?: The impact of prosperity on European identity is not clear. While 
perceiving one’s own and one’s country’s economic situation as good increases the likelihood 
to have a European identity, being from a country that is a net contributor to the EU budget 
reduces this significantly. In contrast, being from a country that is economically integrated 
with the world, again has a positive effect. Finally, considering economic issues as contrib-
uting to an ‘EU community feeling’ again has a positive effect. All in all, this does not call for 
more EU-level economic policies, but it sends a note of caution about the asymmetric impact 
of redistribution among donors and recipients. 
5. Reliability and similarity: The results for civic and cultural aspects of European identity seem 
to call for a serious implementation of the rule of law on the one hand, and safeguarding cul-
tural traditions on the other. Additionally, travel and exchange might help to broaden under-
standing for other cultures and exploring similarities and fruitful dissimilarities. 
In the following, we will present policy proposals that we seek to relate to these five target groups. 
This study attempts to gather and evaluate proposals to raise European identity while explicitly valu-
ing diversity.  
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5. Proposals on how to Activate an ‘EU Feeling’ 
 
5.1. Existing Policies  
 
The following illustration maps existing policies supposed to promote a feeling of EU belonging. We 
include this to give an idea about what there already is and to what the proposals, which we will pre-
sent in the next section, will add and complement. We do not attempt to give an exhaustive list of 
measures, instead we seek to give a broad picture about the most prominently known measures and 
the general types of measures that are considered to affect European identity. As our matrix that we 
developed above (Table 1 in section 2.1), the tables below distinguish between a civic and a cultural 
component of European identity on the one hand, and aspects of input and output legitimacy on the 
other. With regard to the cultural component and some related aspects of the civic component of 
identity, we expand the matrix using the literature’s main factors in Table 6: exchange, information 
and education, common heritage and other commonalities. In both subsequent tables, the measures 
are sorted so that they refer to either one or two columns.  
Table 5: Existing political measures – civic idenity. 
 
Table 6: Existing political measures – cultural identity. 
 
• Passport 
• License plates 
• Free mobility, 
Schengen 
• Roaming 
• EU-wide job agency 
(EURES) 
• Regional/cohesion 
policy, EFSI 
• Voting in local 
elections 
• Voting in EU 
Parliament 
elections 
• Citizens’ initiative 
• Citizen’s dialogues 
• Structured dialogue 
(youth) 
• Petitions, 
complaints, 
consultations 
Civic identity 
Polity Politics Policy 
Input legitimacy Output legitimacy 
• EU Volunteering 
(EU Solidarity Corps) 
• Erasmus+ 
• European Capital 
of Culture 
• European Year of 
Cultural Heritage • School exchanges 
• Free Interrail ticket 
• Town twinning 
• EU Simulations 
• EU year themes 
Cultural identity 
Exchange Information/ 
education 
Common heritage/ 
commonalities 
Civic identity 
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Starting with Table 5, the EU allows citizens to move across EU countries and become a citizen of the 
country abroad at least to some extent, and from the EU directly. Living in another EU country, EU 
citizens are allowed to vote in local elections, and thereby, to take part in their most closely related 
political sphere. This is legally anchored as a systemic aspect (‘polity’) that empowers citizens to take 
part in local politics directly. At the EU level, citizens elect the members of the European Parliament 
directly, which gives them the opportunity to vote for representatives that they believe are compe-
tent to working towards EU legislation in their interest. 
Moreover, at the EU level, citizens’ have the right to engage in EU politics via a number of means. In 
contrast to voting, which is part of the polity and where a citizen’s vote has an immediate impact 
(election), the means to engage in politics allow at best an indirect impact on legislation. In that re-
gard, the European citizens’ initiative and petitions to the European Parliament give the most far-
reaching competencies. Whereas the latter works similar as for other parliaments, the citizens’ initia-
tive has, since its introduction with the Treaty of Lisbon, been successful only for four initiatives. The 
requirements are considered relatively high to collect one million signatories25. On successful com-
pletion, the Commission and the European Parliament are requested to discuss the issue and the 
Commission has to voice an opinion.  
Furthermore, citizens can engage in EU consultations, formal complaints26 and other informal ways 
to give their view and perspective on a topic27. Young people’s advice is sought for instance in the 
format of the Structured Dialogue28 and school dialogues (‘Your Europe Your Say’)29. The most popu-
lar example among EU Commissioners is the Citizens’ Dialogue30, where Commissioners take Q&A in 
front of a large audience. Recently, the French President Macron in his speech about the EU’s future 
(European Political Strategy Centre, 2017) as well as the new German government support the idea 
to continue this sort of citizens’ involvement. 
Finally, the EU passed a number of legislations (‘policy’) that seek to facilitate travelling or living 
abroad for EU citizens and to provide a state-like sense of the EU. The most prominent examples are 
certainly the European flag, the European anthem, the common passport and license plates. Moreo-
ver, the majority of EU people certainly have seen at least once a European flag around their local 
area indicating financial support in the framework of regional development or cohesion policy. Add-
ing to the general principles of free mobility to travel and work, and Schengen (for the majority of EU 
states), there is now free-of-charge roaming for mobile phone calls. To facilitate working abroad, the 
EU Commission runs an EU-wide job agency online platform (EURES)31 for both private and public job 
openings all across the EU. Moreover, it offers practical help regarding living and working abroad. 
With regards to fostering exchanges to promoting the cultural component of European identity 
(Table 6), the EU offers a number of programs to support this. The most prominent program is cer-
                                                            
25  Organizers have to collect at least one million signatories from at least 7 member states. On top, there are 
country-specific minimum numbers of signatories required. EU Commission website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/how-it-works/collection. 
26  EU Commission website: https://europa.eu/european-union/law/have-your-say_en; 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations_en. 
27  General EU Commission website on citizens‘ involvement: http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.htm. 
28  The Youth Forum 2017 website: http://youthconf.eu/; https://europa.eu/newsroom/events/european-
youth-conference-0_en. 
29  Your Europe Your Say website: https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/agenda/our-events/events/your-europe-
your-say-2018/about-yeys. 
30  EU Commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/events/citizens-dialogues_en. 
31  EURES website: https://ec.europa.eu/eures. 
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tainly Erasmus, which has recently been broadened to cover not only students but also pupils, school 
classes, social workers from all fields, sport clubs and youth organizations. The newly named Eras-
mus+ program facilitates and financially supports stays abroad for educational purposes. Further-
more, there are programs to facilitate exchanges between schools (eTwinning)32 and towns33. Re-
cently, the EU Commission also included in their budget proposal provisions for funds for free Inter-
rail travel tickets for EU citizens turning 18 years old34. Giving also the voluntary services a European 
perspective, the European Solidarity Corps35 offers an online platform and support to serve voluntari-
ly in projects all across the EU.  
Education and exchange also matter for the civic component of identity. The Model European Un-
ion36 allows young people to engage in EU politics in a role game and to discuss actual EU legislation. 
The Model takes place in Strasbourg at the premises of the European Parliament. A number of other 
similar models are organized by youth organizations across the EU, one prominent example being the 
Simulation European Parliament (SIMEP)37 in Berlin, organized by the Junge Europäische Bewegung 
(JEB). Furthermore, since 1983, the EU defines ‘year themes’38 to make aware of a particular policy 
area or social problem under whose heading a number of projects are run. In 2018, it is the year of 
cultural heritage39 in the EU promoting a number of projects on the topic on the local, national, and 
EU level. The aim is to bring EU people closer together and raise awareness for both the common 
heritage and common future. In that sense, each year, the EU awards two or three cities in the EU to 
be ‘European Capitals of Culture‘ (European Commission, 2018c)40 for that year. 
 
5.2. Proposals to Encourage European Identity 
 
In the following, we specify new projects that, according to categories drawn from the literature and 
our empirical findings, seem promising to have a positive impact on European identity. We will espe-
cially focus on aspects and target groups that we have identified in the empirical section of this 
study: education and information, exchange, adults and elderly people as well as people from a weak 
economic background. We will include publically discussed proposals, proposals found in the empiri-
cal literature discussed above and some own proposals. Again, we do not seek to give an exhaustive 
list but to discuss some of the most promising or prominent proposals. With this, we aim to stimulate 
and feed into the current debate at the EU level. As in the previous section, each proposal will be 
sorted in one of the two following tables. We further elaborate six proposals that seem especially 
promising (see boxes below). 
 
                                                            
32  ETwinning website: https://www.etwinning.net/en/pub/index.htm. 
33  EU Commission website for funding: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/europe-for-citizens/funding/town-
twinning-2018-round-1_en. 
34  EU Commission press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-18-1443_en.htm. 
35  European Solidarity Corps website: https://europa.eu/youth/solidarity_en. 
36  Model European Union website: http://www.meu-strasbourg.org/. 
37  SIMEP website: http://www.simep.eu/. 
38  EU Commission website: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/european-years_en. 
39  EU Commission website: https://europa.eu/cultural-heritage/. 
40      EU Commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/actions/capitals-culture_en. 
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Table 7: Proposals – civic identity. 
 
 
Table 8: Proposals – cultural identity. 
 
 
Table 7 maps policy proposals that target fostering the civic component of European identity. The 
basic ideas behind the majority of proposals targeting input legitimacy are to increase transparency, 
the competition of political ideas and solutions, and to make institutions more efficient to foster 
their core mandate in the political system. This is assumed to foster trust, satisfaction with democra-
cy and citizen participation in the democratic system.  
Firstly, as regards the political system (‘polity’), proposals focus on the role of the European Parlia-
ment in EU legislative decision-making, and, thereby, more direct involvement of citizens. At the core 
is the right of initiative (see recent discussion in Hübner et al., 2017, p. 37), which is currently exclu-
sively held by the European Commission. Extending it to the European Parliament – as is usual for 
advanced democracies – would increase the debate about policy solutions and lead to more political 
competition. Proposals to make the European Parliament fully participating in all EU legislations 
point to a similar end (European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 2016). Some go as 
Civic identity 
Polity Politics Policy 
Input legitimacy Output legitimacy 
• Citizens’ assembly 
• Citizens’ survey 
• Community counsels 
• Limit office terms 
• Elect COM president 
• Constitutional convention 
• Transnational party lists 
• EP two chambers 
• Right of initiative: EP and Council 
• National parliaments ‘green card’ 
procedure 
• Common visionary 
project (e.g. research 
or infrastructure) 
• Energy independence 
• Revise Art. 7 proce-
dure 
• Competency 
redistribution 
• EU consular offices 
• Common road signs 
• EU activities report 
Civic identity 
Cultural identity 
Exchange Information/ 
education 
Common heritage/ 
commonalities 
• ‘European Waltz’ 
• Vocational Erasmus 
• Pensioners’ Erasmus 
• European parliamentary scholarships 
• EU Agency for 
Civic Education 
• EU public service 
broadcaster 
 
  
• 9 May bank holiday 
• Anthem at sports 
events 
• History Erasmus 
• School history 
competition 
• European sports 
teams • Learn two EU foreign languages 
• School twinning 
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far as to propose to transform the Parliament and the Council of Ministers into a two-chamber par-
liamentary system (Young European Federalists, 2016). However, this would constitute a major 
change of the EU polity and delicate Treaty revisions. Being equipped with more competencies might 
also increase turnout in European Parliament elections. In that regard, there are proposals to estab-
lish transnational party lists for the election in order to increase awareness of the ‘European’ quality 
of these elections (see Box 1). This would build on the 2014 informal practice to nominate lead can-
didates for EU-wide party families, which has been widely acknowledged and seems again set for the 
next election in 2019. Limiting terms in office for elected politicians (United Europe, 2017) would 
also increase competition and transparency. Finally, increased involvement of national parliaments is 
considered to raise debates and awareness of European politics, as genuinely European as well as in 
relation to national interests. Therefore, a group of parliamentarians and researchers (Hübner et al., 
2017) suggest to introduce a ‘green card’ procedure for involving national Parliaments in EU deci-
sion-making. In contrast to voice objections as in the Lisbon Treaty’s yellow and orange card proce-
dure or as in the red card procedure proposed for Cameron’s UK remain deal, the green card proce-
dure would request explicit consent of the majority of national parliaments.  
With regards to the European Commission, proposals seek to strengthen the executive mandate of 
the Commission as ‘Guardian of the Treaties’. This would also increase transparency as to what the 
mandate of the Commission currently is and shall be: political or executive. At the core are ideas to 
increase transparency and strengthening the Commission’s competencies to enforce EU rule of law. 
Especially in light of the developments in Poland and Hungary towards reducing the division of pow-
ers, high levels of corruption in some new EU member states, and freedom of the press in Malta and 
Slovakia, defending EU democratic values is at stake. Hübner et al. (2017) suggest to revise the Arti-
cle 7 procedure to make it more applicable to that end. Currently, the European Council has a major 
role in the process and has to decide with unanimity – which proves inapplicable if more than one 
country is in question of a breach. In order to increase transparency and to provide detailed objective 
information to the public, we suggest to make the Commission’s annual General Report on the activ-
ities of the EU41 compulsory to be presented to the European Parliament. The report’s objective is to 
summarize all activities by all EU institutions. Therefore, there shall be a set of rigorous rules on the 
content and level of detail of the presented facts. Before 2015, the report had around 200-300 pages 
with detailed information on finalized, current and in-the-making legislation; now it has about 120 
pages with a lot less information. On the composition of the Commission, the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs (2016) suggests to reduce the number of vice-presidents and 
make the Commission in general more efficient. In contrast, Commission President Juncker (2017) 
suggested to merge the positions of the Commission president and the president of the European 
Council. This would certainly politicize the executive mandate of the Commission even further. Simi-
larly, proposals to have the Commission president directly elected might enhance the political role 
of the position. 
Box 1: Transnational party lists 
Most recently proposed by French President Macron (2017) in his speech about the future of the EU, 
transnational party lists would accompany national party lists in European Parliament (EP) elections. 
The idea is to endow members of the EP with a genuine ‘European interest’ – and a ‘European’ con-
                                                            
41  Access to the current report: https://europa.eu/european-union/documents-publications/reports-
booklets/general-report_en. 
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stituency to be accountable to. This shall also raise participation in European Parliament elections 
and increase the ‘European’ notion of day-to-day politics. 
Details: Macron suggests to have half of the EP elected on transnational party lists. The constituency 
would, hence, not relate to the usual local or national constituencies to which an elected member of 
the EP is accountable to, but it would relate to the entirety of the EU. European party families would 
each set up a list with the lead candidate at the very top. People from the list would then need to 
campaign in several member states, and, therefore, seek to find policy issues that are of interest for 
many of them, hence, of ‘true’ European nature. 
History: The idea is not new but has been voiced with similar goals before. The most recent promi-
nent example was the report by the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
(2011). Alongside a number of other measures to reform the EP election procedure, the report sug-
gested to assign 25 additional seats to a transnational voting procedure. Most recently again, in Feb-
ruary 201842, the European Parliament rejected a proposal to re-allocate the current British seats 
after Brexit43 to a transnational constituency. The topic is very much up to date and has, despite the 
EP’s rejection, not yet lost attraction. 
Pros & cons: Federalists endorse the idea hoping for it to be a real game changer and encourage poli-
ticians to advocate for truly European interests. Economists as well see the proposal in a positive 
light as from a public finance perspective it might help to reduce pork-barrel politics. Political scien-
tists would note that, usually voting based on lists instead of smaller constituencies results in politi-
cians being more loyal towards their party than towards the people in a constituency. On a more 
negative note, the historian Winkler (2017) urges that the current heterogeneity of the member 
states’ party systems in terms of experience, endurance, and ethics of politicians risks to run counter 
these ideals. From a constitutional justice perspective, a transnational list would contribute to reduc-
ing the current misrepresentation of voters from different member states due to the allocation of 
seats to member states. In contrast, the European Parliament’s DG for Internal Policies (2015) fears 
that in fact the lists would lead to an overrepresentation of large member states as there politicians 
have a greater audience, and, therefore more potential voters. However, the lists would allow people 
who are engaged in parties to remain engaged even when working or living in another EU country. 
Finally, Hübner et al. (2017) suggest that transnational party lists would also require a “uniform, EU-
wide electoral procedure” (p. 40). This could also be a starting point for striving towards more ‘Euro-
peanized’ EP elections without transnational party lists. For instance, as Jouvenat (2016) notes: 
“should European transnational political parties exist, there would be no need for transnational 
lists”. He suggests that one could just stick to the current process but have people voting for Europe-
an parties instead for national parties – keeping the usual local constituencies. 
All in all, the proposal seeks to raise European identity from a civic perspective and tries to build an 
awareness for a European constituency in that regard. Target groups are voters of all kind as well as 
increasing information and discussions (‘cognitive mobilization’) about elections. 
With regard to strengthening the civic component of European identity through participation in poli-
tics, we recommend to pay attention to the Dutch and Irish examples of citizen’s assemblies and 
                                                            
42  European Parliament’s interactive website on the legislative procedure: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-union-of-democratic-change/file-reform-of-the-
electoral-law-of-the-eu. 
43  European Parliament’s interactive website on seat redistribution: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20180126STO94114/eu-elections-how-
many-meps-will-each-country-get-in-2019. 
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evaluate a citizens’ assembly at the EU level (see Box 2). This could complement the Commission’s 
current Citizens’ Dialogues and advance them further both in terms of citizen engagement intensity 
and breadth of debates and resulting insights for the policy process. This could also take up the idea 
that Macron voiced with the ‘democratic convention’ or ‘citizens’ survey’. At the beginning of his 
movement ‘En marche’, volunteers cast an extensive door-to-door survey with about 80.000 French 
people to hear about what they perceive as most pressing political issues. The still very young Anti-
Brexit movement ‘Renew’ in the UK tries to do the same44. Another idea in that regard comes from 
Austria where ‘community counsels’ (‘Gemeinderäte’), local politicians, explain EU policies to local 
citizens (Wurm, no date). The EU-wide ‘Ladder’ project works similarly and focuses on development 
issues45. As discussed in Box 2, the Citizens’ Assembly would allow a much more targeted and intense 
engagement of citizens with a more practical use of insights from citizens to feed into EU politics. 
Box 2: Citizens’ Assembly 
Based on Ireland’s46 recent experience47 we propose to establish a European Citizens’ Assembly. The 
Citizens’ Assembly would gather a representative sample of the EU population for discussing a rele-
vant und timely political issue. The Assembly would meet in Strasbourg when the European Parlia-
ment is not convening. The final outcome would be a decision (if it’s an issue with clear options, e.g. 
yes/no) or report (if it’s more complex, e.g. guidelines). The file would be sent to all EU and national 
institutions and be presented to the European Council, the European Parliament, and the Commis-
sion College. The report would not have any formal impact, instead it would enrich the political de-
bate and stimulate politics on an issue. Moreover, it could develop into a citizens’ initiative or could 
find support with EU or national institutions. The main purpose is to get people involved in issues 
discussed at the EU level, to inform them and to learn about their perspectives. Moreover, they 
would feed their experiences back to their close environment and, thereby, serve as invaluable mul-
tipliers. They would also bring in their environment’s arguments and questions to enrich the Assem-
bly’s discussion. Thereby, the Assembly would contribute to forming a ‘European demos’ on the one 
hand, and efficiently facilitating insights from the people to the policy-making process. 
Details: For a start, participants could discuss policy issues with little potential to increase conflict 
between member states. Secondly, they could discuss the EU’s currently most complex and difficult 
issues such as finding a solution on the very difficult balance between allowing migration and secur-
ing borders or a reform of the European Monetary Union’s institutional set-up. Because both are 
very complex and controversially debated issues, the Assembly could draft guidelines on how they 
want an EU policy to look like. 
Participants would be selected based on an EU-wide lottery among all EU citizens who are eligible to 
vote in general elections. The selection could be organized by the Eurobarometer as they have the 
necessary administrative experience. In Ireland, selection was organized by an opinion poll agency, 
too, and was based on a few criteria to ensure a representative sample: gender, age, region, and 
social class. For a start, one could think of about 100 to 200 participants in order to ensure practica-
bility. Each participant would have a deputy. In Ireland, selected people could withdraw before the 
assembly started. Then, their deputy would take over. Deputies could not take over once the Assem-
                                                            
44   Renew website: https://renewbritain.org/our-story/. 
45  EU Commission website: http://www.ladder-project.eu/. 
46  Ireland’s Citizens Assembly website: https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/Home/. 
47  With the ‘Bürgerwerkstatt Außenpolitik’ (citizens’ workshop on foreign policy’), the German Federal For-
eign Office attempted something similar but far less formal; website: https://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/de/aamt/aussenpolitiklive/buergerwerkstatt-node. 
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bly had started discussing a specific topic. They could only take over once the Assembly moved on to 
discuss a new topic. As language might certainly be a barrier, EU institutions could provide for trans-
lation services. 
The Assembly would have a small secretariat that organizes the formal proceedings of the meetings. 
They would gather and provide all relevant materials, legislative proposals, studies, statements, 
etc.48. The head of the Assembly would chair the secretariat and the general meetings. This person 
would not have a formal vote but only serve as facilitator to the discussions. Moreover, the secretar-
iat would help in drafting the final report together with members of the Assembly. The Assembly 
would consist of an introductory meeting, several meetings in smaller groups, and two concluding 
sessions with voting on the final report. The Assembly can also invite experts or representatives from 
institutions to present their research or statements in public hearings. The smaller groups would 
allow to discuss an issue in detail49. Representatives of the groups would work on drafting the final 
report. Meetings could take place once per month on a weekend. Like in Ireland, expenses would be 
reimbursed, however, participation would be honorary. The EU public services broadcaster could air 
all meetings and, therewith, provide for an even broader inclusion of people across the EU. 
Pros & cons: It is to note that the Assembly would not have any formal role in the EU’s political sys-
tem. It is not considered a new Parliament or the like. Rather, the aim is to bring the current citizens’ 
dialogues to a truly insightful and efficient new level. This is exactly what Juncker (2017) and Macron 
(2017) appealed to in their speeches in September 2017. The Assembly would build on this adminis-
trative infrastructure and use readily available hosting and technical services at the European Parlia-
ment. The assembly would bring together diverse views from all across the EU, involve both EU en-
thusiasts and those with little education or interest in EU politics, yet. Moreover, they would feed 
back to and bring in their close environment’s questions, perspectives, and arguments and, thereby, 
reflect a large proportion of the EU’s population. The Assembly would encourage an extraordinary 
level of civic European identity, just by facilitating a serious democratic debate. Moreover, it would 
enhance exchange, knowledge, and language skills, and, thereby, contribute for EU citizens to finding 
shared policy perspectives and commonalities. 
Proposals on specific policies that are supposed to increase the civic component of European identi-
ty, are wide-spread. Here, we only look at a condensation of them along with one original proposal. 
First of all, big common visionary projects in sciences have shown to raise a particular European 
awareness. The most recent examples are certainly the navigation system Galileo and the Philae 
space lander. Besides space and science, large projects in for instance transports could facilitate citi-
zens’ mobility and also raise a feeling of true European aspect and benefit to daily-life politics. The 
idea is to achieve a goal that a member state could not have achieved alone. The Connecting Europe 
Facility supports different kinds of transport means and seeks to advance transport networks50. For 
instance, a European High Speed train network could especially connect the new member states. This 
                                                            
48  One could think of European Council conclusions and other formal decisions taken so far, Commission 
papers, information documents for members of the European Parliament, advice from the legal services 
of the different EU institutions (e.g. Council, European Parliament), the Commission (or the European Par-
liament) could provide a brief evaluation (e.g. 20 pages) of the competing arguments presented by lobby-
ing groups (or national parliaments and governments), summary of citizens’ petitions etc., scientific brief-
ings and studies, and a brief description of the political system of the EU. 
49  Meetings could take place as many times as deemed necessary for a specific topic. One could start off 
with four or six meetings, these could be extended by a further one or two meetings several times. In Ire-
land, the discussion of a specific topic shall have been concluded within a year. 
 
50  EU Commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure_en. 
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would directly speak to the target groups that we have identified in the literature and the empirical 
section. In that regard, the idea of introducing common road signs could also contribute to common 
identification and facilitate traveling. However, this might also be interpreted as a means to decon-
struct national traditions with regard to the make-up of signs and their function to provide orienta-
tion. An idea similar to a common visionary project is to seek Energy independence and thereby 
promote a European feeling (United Europe, 2017). The reason lies not with protectionism but in-
stead with security policy considerations that have been repeatedly named in Eurobarometer sur-
veys as a current or future challenge to the EU and its member states. In that regard, there are also 
several proposals that advocate for redistributing competencies between the national and the Euro-
pean level so as to achieve higher efficiency for tackling policy problems such as in the area of de-
fense or migration policy (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017; Blesse et al., 2016). This is especially relevant 
for discussing the further institutional development of the European Monetary Union and calls for an 
appropriate mix between EU-wide solidarity schemes and effective incentives for responsible fiscal 
policies (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018). An original idea in terms of EU ‘added value’ and efficiency is 
certainly the establishment of EU consular offices (Bertelsmann-Stiftung, 2013), which we present in 
more detail in Box 3. 
Box 3: EU consular offices 
In a joint study by Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) (Ber-
telsmann Stiftung, 2013, pp. 56.), experts suggest to establish an ‘EU embassy with 28 flags’. The 
embassies could provide consular services for all EU citizens, while foreign policy would remain na-
tional competency. EU embassies all around the world would not only increase efficiency and out-
reach for EU citizens, the 29 flags (28 plus the EU flag) would also signal to EU citizens in need that 
the EU and all member states are there to help. The EU is their home. This might have a positive im-
pact on citizens’ European identification. 
Details: The Lisbon Treaty already laid the ground by prescribing that every EU member state’s em-
bassy shall provide for consular support for all EU citizens (Art. 20 TFEU). Adding to other co-
operation in the field (see ‘history’), one could indeed think of a genuine EU embassy building that 
comprises national representations. The embassy could provide consular services for all EU citizens 
alike, while foreign policy, more complicated diplomatic issues and preparation of national politi-
cians’ visits (adding to the usual embassy’s tasks such as political and economic relations, trade and 
development aid policy, support of military missions, cultural relations and security services) could 
remain with the national delegations in the same ‘house’. This idea builds on the conservative sce-
nario of the Bertelsmann Stiftung report that identifies European added value with regard to consu-
lar services and general administration in particular. For practical reasons, it might be helpful to also 
establish the possibility for the EU embassy to hand out short-notice ‘laissez-passez’ travel docu-
ments for all EU citizens, for instance in case they lost their passport. They would be valid only for a 
couple of days until the person is back in their home country. General ‘laissez-passez’ travel docu-
ments exist already for EU civil servants. Brexit brought the idea of a genuine ‘EU citizenship’ back on 
the agenda. A citizens’ initiative51 seeks to introduce a ‘union citizenship’ for all EU citizens. This 
would allow British people to keep their ‘EU citizenship’ additional to their British one, even after 
Brexit. 
                                                            
51  Citizens’ initiative ‘Retaining European Citizenship’ website: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/initiatives/open/details/2017/000005?lg=en. 
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History: It is already common place for small countries to buy-in representations of larger countries 
for consular services. Countries co-operate already with regard to Schengen provisions or visa appli-
cation centers in third countries. Moreover, the European External Action Service already has the 
relevant network across the world with regard to foreign policy issues and diplomatic assistance for 
the High representative of the EU. The ‘EU consular offices’ could build on this experience and infra-
structure.  
Pros & cons: EU consular offices are considered to bring significant financial and administrative sav-
ings. The Bertelsmann Stiftung report calculates a total saving of at least € 420 mio. per year. Stand-
ardization of procedures would increase the overall quality of consular services. Furthermore, the 
offices would substitute redundant national representations, provide for economies of scale and 
offer an optimized spatial distribution instead of the currently highly clustered structure. In contrast, 
the report acknowledges an “undeniable existence of national interests in foreign affairs” (Bertels-
man Stiftung, 2013, p. 11). Therefore, those policy areas shall remain with the national representa-
tions, in order to allow a truly fruitful EU co-operation. 
Following Table 8, we now turn to proposals that focus on increasing exchange, education and in-
formation, and an awareness of general commonalities, in particular the common heritage. 
Measures here relate to both the cultural and the civic component.  
Starting with fostering exchanges, a school twinning program similar to the town twinning program 
would be an interesting option. Building on the already existing dense networks of some schools, we 
suggest that each school all across the EU shall have at least one twinning school in another EU 
member state. The schools should be given some time to seek for a suitable school and be supported 
with technical and administrative assistance by the eTwinning website named above. This also sup-
ports Macron’s claim to enable “half of school population under the age of 25 to spend at least 6 
months in another EU Member State” (European Political Strategy Centre, 2017, p. 11). Secondly, in 
order to facilitate communication and exchanges between people from different EU countries, lan-
guage proficiency is essential. Therefore, we suggest to establish an EU-wide language curriculum as 
a minimum standard: for example, each pupil should have the opportunity to learn at least two for-
eign languages for at least two years each. Additionally, one could think of expanding this to universi-
ties and after work classes. Moreover, in an interconnected world, language proficiency is not just a 
means for communicating during holidays and building a European identity, moreover, it is essential 
for labor market success. 
As regards strengthening exchanges with respect to the civic component of identity, we suggest to 
establish ‘European parliamentary scholarships’. Similar to the German Bundestag’s ‘international 
parliamentary scholarships52, the program would allow young people from any EU member state to 
apply for an internship in another EU member state’s parliament. Accordingly, this would require 
establishing a network between national parliaments, including the European Parliament, which al-
lows to facilitate the exchanges. The network could even expand to regional parliaments. With this, 
young people could experience how democracy works in another country and could expand their 
knowledge, skills, language proficiency, and personal contacts. 
In order to foster exchange and education at the same time, we advocate for expanding the idea of 
the Erasmus program to three more target groups: pensioners, vocational education, and all em-
                                                            
52  The Bundestag’s website on the international parliamentary scholarship program: 
https://www.bundestag.de/ips#url=L2Rva3VtZW50ZS90ZXh0YXJjaGl2LzIwMTgva3cwMi1pcHMvNTM2NjQ
2&mod=mod486734. 
50 
 
ployed people. Starting with the latter, we strongly recommend to establish a scheme that allows all 
employed people to spend some time in another EU country and work and live there. In the style of 
journeymen’s journeys, we propose to found the European Waltz program (see Box 4). This would 
allow a large group of people to effectively engage in exploring European countries. Moreover, simi-
lar to the classic Erasmus program for students, we propose to establish a similar program for stu-
dents in vocational education: Vocational Erasmus. A significant challenge is posed by the very dif-
ferent structures of vocational education and apprenticeships in EU member states. Besides this be-
ing a major potential future benefit of EU-harmonization, a simple short cut could be to establish an 
‘EU course’ in all curricula. For instance, there could be the opportunity to make an internship of 
about one or two months right after the final exams. Finally, we propose to establish an Erasmus 
scheme especially for pensioners: Pensioners’ Erasmus (see Box 5).  
Box 4: European Waltz  
We propose to newly establish the program ‘European Waltz’. It would allow all employed adults to 
work and live some time in another EU country. According to their current job, they would work in a 
similar job in a country of their choice for a couple of weeks or months. The idea builds on the jour-
neymen in craftsmanship who travel around to learn from other habits and skills and, thereby, to 
improve and broaden their knowledge. The same fruitful logic can indeed be found in a number of 
business sectors and one wonders why this has not yet been encouraged, especially in the EU that 
seeks to wipe away any kind of border that stands in the way of European unification. Taking part in 
such an exchange would not only improve working skills, but also foster exchange (‘transnational 
contact’), and getting to know other ways of life (‘cognitive mobilization’). Moreover, people would 
feel a direct benefit from the EU’s attempts to facilitate working abroad. 
Details: The aim is to expand the scope of people who can participate in on-the-job experiences 
abroad and exchanges. Teachers and social workers can already go abroad with Erasmus+, and for 
architects, journalists, academics, and artists it is a genuine part of their work to go abroad. However, 
the program seems especially plausible for a number of business areas in so called sheltered sectors: 
       -      Nurses, doctors, people from the health sector in general 
       -    Civil service officials working in the areas of taxes, customs, municipal administration, land 
              registration office, social security schemes, job agencies, ministries, specialized authorities 
              (e.g. environmental authority) 
       -      Judges, lawyers, lawyer assistants, judiciary employees 
       -      Transport area, train drivers, stewards 
       -      Craftsmanship: bakers, butchers, farmers, employees in food production, car mechanics 
For people working in the industry, in engineering or software engineering this is more difficult as 
confidentiality issues might be especially prominent. The exchange and placement could be orga-
nized via a European chamber of commerce, such as Eurochambres53 or the European Commission’s 
Enterprise Europe Network54, collaboration of civil services, and professional associations. Regarding 
the latter, one could even think of fostering the establishment of EU-wide professional associations. 
First-hand administrative and technical assistance could be given by the Commission’s Erasmus pro-
gram.  
                                                            
53  Eurochambres’ website: http://www.eurochambres.eu/Content/Default.asp?.  
54  Enterprise Europe Network’s website: https://een.ec.europa.eu/. 
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Pros & cons: Even though there is a great need of further harmonizing vocational degrees and certifi-
cates, the program could be successful when building on work experience explicitly. In a first in-
stance, the job exchanges could legally be framed as internships of a maximum length of six weeks to 
avoid tax related or social security related difficulties. The Council would need to decide on the legal 
fundaments of such a leave of work. Firstly, the Council could agree on implementing into national 
law the provision of an unpaid leave of absence for up to six weeks for the purpose of taking part in 
the ‘European Waltz’. The leave could be paid in case of a proper exchange, meaning that exactly two 
participants switch their jobs. In a second step, one could think of establishing the scheme as a legal-
ly official ‘EU leave’ that would allow to take time off work in the home country in order to engage in 
an exchange abroad. This could be similar to the Nordic example of a ‘parental leave’. All in all, this 
would significantly improve exchanges between people in the EU. Moreover, this could also be a 
means to especially encourage exchange in neighboring regions of two or more different countries. 
This might be especially fruitful in regions where trans-border contacts are not especially prominent 
such as for instance between Germany and Poland.  
 
Box 5: Pensioners’ Erasmus  
We propose to establish an Erasmus program for pensioners. The empirical results have shown that 
pensioners are less likely to have a European identity. Even though this is also the group of people 
that has most time to travel and engage with other Europeans, they also often have the least ‘re-
sources’ to effectively engage in such activities. Therefore, it needs financial support, some basic 
language proficiency, and sufficient infrastructure safeguards to ensure mobility. Before departure, 
pensioners choose a topic that they would like to explore and hand in a short report on their return. 
Details: The aim is to support pensioners who are eager to learn and to get to know European coun-
tries. They might return as natural advocates of the program and spread the word and, thereby, en-
courage also other pensioners to engage in a short trip. Pensioners would start with reading and 
investigating in a specific region or topic of their choice, which they would like to explore during the 
trip. Upon applying to the program, they are requested to provide a short description of their ‘travel 
project’. On their return, they would formulate a short report on what they discovered – one could 
also imagine putting this in a respective internet blog. Precautions would be required that exclude 
the use of resources for normal tourist trips. These conditions could include the participation in cer-
tain certified cultural, historical, language or social seminars or projects. In addition, the support 
could be conditional on a means-test in order to concentrate the budget on the pensioners with 
binding resource constraints. 
The program would have a financial and a language skills part, possibly accompanied by an adminis-
trative and an infrastructure related part. Firstly, similar to Erasmus, the program would provide fi-
nancial support for short-term journeys up to a couple of weeks. The payments would be made in 
two instalments: one before the journey and one after the report is received. Secondly, financial 
support could also include partial funding for basic language courses before departure. Finally, ideal-
ly, trips would be self-organized but respect the requirements on the above mentioned qualified 
activities. Moreover, the program could provide informational support for the formation of a number 
of EU-wide networks for this purpose, for instance between tourist information offices, through town 
twinning, or pensioners’ residences. In addition, pensioners who would like to engage with European 
pensioners at home, could be supported with information on funding a ‘buddy program’ to invite and 
accompany pensioners from abroad. A mobile app could supply users with travel advice and the 
most important basic language phrases, in particular for medical emergencies, in any of the official 
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EU languages. The European Commission could work on the legal framework for establishing an EU-
wide pay-as-you-go toll card in order to facilitate travelling across borders in the EU.  
Pros & Cons: Much of the proposed measures could also benefit travelers in general and, without 
adequate rules, there is the risk that normal tourists try to free-ride on the program. The suggested 
rules will produce some bureaucracy that, however, seems unavoidable. The big advantage is that 
the program could reach a target group that so far has been rather neglected at a crucial and mental-
ly still relatively open stage in life (pension entry).  
With regard to education and information fostering the civic component of European identity, we 
would like to put forward two ideas. Firstly, in order to promote civic education, the Europa Union 
Deutschland (2017) proposes to found a European Agency for Civic Education. Similar to the German 
‘Federal Agency for Civic Education’55, the agency would provide objective information on EU institu-
tions and issues in all official languages. Additionally, the agency would provide learning material and 
online information. The agency would be fully politically independent and work only towards educat-
ing the EU’s citizens about the EU. Besides being a major source of information, the agency would 
foster debate and tolerance, and would encourage reflecting upon one’s own positions. This might 
prove especially relevant for citizens in countries with little objective information about the EU. In 
order to foster EU-wide objective information, we suggest to establish a European public service 
broadcaster (see Box 6). 
Box 6: EU public service broadcaster 
We propose to consider the establishment of an EU public service broadcaster. It would air a daily 
news show on European issues and all public meetings and hearings of European Institutions. Im-
portantly, the broadcaster shall be entirely public, provide objective information with a high degree 
of independence from politics, and air on normal TV in all official languages. This way, it would com-
plement national public service broadcasters and present a genuine European perspective. This 
would encourage knowledge, information, and discussions about EU politics (‘cognitive mobilization’) 
and speak to all EU citizens who have a TV or internet access in their own language. 
Details: The aim is to provide an easily accessible, independent, and genuinely European source of 
information. The main task would be to air all public meetings, hearings, and press conferences of EU 
institutions, in particular from the European Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Commission, and the new Citizens’ Assembly (or Citizens’ Dialogues)56. The aim is to allow a broad-
caster that meaningfully complements national public service broadcasters and does not position in 
competition to them. Therefore, it shall be founded by all national public service broadcasters and 
the governing body shall also be composed of them only. Accordingly, it would be financed and sup-
ported technically by all national public service broadcasters together. Therefore, the program could 
remain as slim, targeted, and cost efficient as possible. Recording and airing the public meetings, 
hearings, press conferences etc. could be provided by national broadcasters in rotating responsibility. 
They have the technical equipment and are most likely on site anyway. Furthermore, language trans-
lations would already be available from the respective EU institution. The core of the new broadcast-
er would be two independently produced news shows: one 15 minute show around mid-day and one 
                                                            
55  The agency’s website: https://www.bpb.de/die-bpb/138852/federal-agency-for-civic-education. 
56  Good examples of such broadcasters are the German public channel ‘Phoenix’ that airs for instance meet-
ings of the Bundestag, and the Franco-German public channel ‘Arte’.  
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30 minute show in the evening. The show would report about current EU issues, politics, challenges 
and any other news with an impact on the EU. The editorial team would be employed with the Euro-
pean broadcaster directly and not be liable to anyone except journalistic standards and this broad-
caster. The broadcaster shall be fully politically independent and public. In that respect, it could be 
fruitful to learn from the different approaches in the member states to find the most suitable set-up. 
Additionally, the broadcaster could air a special TV show on 9 May with an ‘EU sofa’, where people 
discuss the role of Europe for national history and the common future. The broadcaster shall air in all 
official languages and in normal TV as well as on the internet.  
History:  The only EU-wide broadcaster at the moment is Euronews. However, it does not air on TV 
and is, therefore, not easily accessible for a large audience. Even though, several national public ser-
vice broadcasters take part in Euronews (i.a. via the European Broadcasting Union), the majority of 
shares is held privately.  This does not meet the requirements on independence that we have out-
lined above. ARTE is a German-French cooperation and, hence, not pan-European. Additionally, there 
exist a couple of privately owned EU-wide (online) newspapers: Euractiv, EUobserver, New Europe, 
and Politico Europe. 
Pros & cons: Public service broadcasters are currently discussed controversially, not least with the 
recent referendum in Switzerland about abolishing the national public service broadcaster. The main 
argument is that people would be forced to pay for a broadcaster that does not bring much ‘added 
value’. Instead, supporters emphasize the financial and political independence of national public 
service broadcasters and their mission to provide information most accurately and objectively. With 
this, they often stand in contrast to private news shows that rather have to focus on what ‘sells best’. 
Additionally, a European public service broadcaster could allow for preserving a free press even in 
member states where this was recently challenged. 
Finally, there are several proposals that seek to increase awareness and exploration of commonali-
ties across member states and people. With regards to the civic aspect of European identity, there is 
the wide spread idea to make Europe day on 9 May a bank holiday for all member states and EU 
institutions (Europa Union Deutschland, 2012). Additional to a member state’s national holidays, 
Europe day would symbolize a proper official holiday that unites EU people and allows to take off 
from work and celebrate European integration and peace. In that regard, an early yet withdrawn 
citizens’ initiative called for the creation of a ‘Moveurope Card’ that would allow reduced travel and 
accommodation costs on 9 May to facilitate exploring Europe57.  
Similarly, using symbols for creating a common civic understanding, the European anthem could be 
used a lot more often. In particular, it could be played at sports events (as recently suggested by 
Europa Union Deutschland, 2016). In that regard, we also suggest to consider establishing European 
sports teams. Similar to national ‘all stars’ sports teams who recruit from regional teams, European 
teams could recruit from national teams all across the EU. They could play against similar teams from 
other continents, such as the Latin American team, a West African team, an Oceania team, and so on, 
and could send an additional EU team to the Olympic Games for instance. Competition to get into 
the European team would certainly raise awareness for the European dimension of sports and com-
monalities. Many kinds of sports have already European championships, and football has additionally 
the Champions League, where teams enter into competition against each other at a European level. 
The idea to establish genuine European sports teams, would complement this by a common Europe-
an perspective. 
                                                            
57  Citizens’ initiative website: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/initiatives/obsolete/details/2014/000003?lg=en.  
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Finally, considering the common historical heritage as a fundament for future engagement with Eu-
ropean integration, we suggest to expand the Erasmus idea also in this area and to focus especially 
on two groups: pupils and adults. We make this distinction since adults can more easily travel around 
than students, but students shall be in the position to take part with little costs. Thereby, we add to 
the numerous already existing programs for bringing history closer to people58 with two targeted 
programs. Firstly, we propose to found a School History Prize. Individual pupils or small groups of 
pupils would be asked to explore their local community and find out about the European dimension 
of local historical events. For instance, this could either be an event that took place in that area and is 
part of European history or a local historical event that might have affected the history of a neighbor-
ing member state or transnational minority groups. The prize could be drawn at different levels, for 
each school, region, member state and at the EU level and could be under the patronage of a promi-
nent EU position, for instance the President of the European Council as the head of all member 
states.  
Secondly, we suggest to establish a History Erasmus scheme that is open for all adults. This could be 
a targeted fund under the general Erasmus+ program that hands out small travel grants. For in-
stance, a German would like to travel to Verdun to get to know more about the common history. He 
or she could apply for funding und would in exchange write a brief report (half a page) about their 
experience, the questions with which they arrived and those with which they returned. The report 
could be published on an online platform. This would enhance individual engagement with history 
and, on top, facilitating transnational contacts and cognitive mobilization. Personal experiences most 
often have a high multiplication effect and people might encourage others to doing this as well. 
There could be a special scheme targeted on exploring the new member states.  
The proposals gathered here cover all main determinants on European identity identified in the liter-
ature. By gathering existing proposals and suggesting new proposals, we seek to build on these de-
terminants and respond to the different categories of our matrix. In particular, the proposals pre-
sented in detail in the boxes respond to the target groups derived from our empirical analysis: 
1. Keep students and add pensioners: We propose to establish the Pensioners’ Erasmus pro-
gram. 
2. Strengthen education and information (‘cognitive mobilization’): We propose to establish an 
EU public services broadcaster. 
3. Foster travel and exchange (‘transnational contacts’): We propose to establish the European 
Waltz program. 
4. Tackle economic inequality for EU participation: Building on the example from Ireland, we 
suggest to establish a Citizens’ Assembly at the EU level. Moreover, we took the issue of re-
stricted personal financial means into account when designing the Pensioners’ Erasmus and 
the European Waltz programs. 
5. Foster reliability, citizenship, and similarity: In order to increase the civic aspect of European 
identity we present the currently highly debated proposal to establish EU-wide transnational 
party lists and the proposal to establish EU consular offices. 
The broad selection of proposals together with the six proposals that we have elaborated in more 
detail gives both policy makers as well as interested and engaged citizens and organizations intri-
guing ideas and arguments at hand. During our search for proposals, we found a large range of al-
                                                            
58  European Commission websites on history funding programs: http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/europe-for-
citizens-programme/index_en.htm; https://ec.europa.eu/culture/calls/european-remembrance-
%E2%80%93-2018_en. 
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ready existing schemes and committed organizations that all seek to bring EU citizens closer together 
and strive for European exchange in many respects. As the literature and our empirical study let as-
sume, all these attempts seem promising to encourage European identity. However, a large part of 
the population is not yet actively involved with the offers and in this section we put forward ideas on 
how to encourage them. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to identify target groups and proposals to strengthen European identity. 
Starting from a detailed discussion about conceptualizing European identity, we opted for a practical 
approach and describe European identity as having both a cultural and civic component of identity. 
In order to locate policy proposals most meaningfully, we set up a matrix between cultural and civic 
components of European identity on the one hand, and categories of political legitimacy (polity, poli-
tics, policy) on the other. We further distinguish European identity from EU support theoretically. 
Subsequently, we discussed both with respect to descriptive statistics and show that they evolved 
differently, and responded differently to the crisis, though, with similar long-term trends. In section 3 
we reviewed the current literature on determinants influencing European identity and EU support. 
We found that both are shaped by very similar factors. In section 4, we tested those factors for the 
current state of European identity in the EU with the most recent Eurobarometer data. Essentially, 
we could confirm the literature’s findings and identified five themes and related target groups:  
1) Keep students and add pensioners: We propose to establish the Pensioners’ Erasmus pro-
gram. 
2) Strengthen education and information (‘cognitive mobilization’): We propose to establish 
an EU public services broadcaster. 
3) Foster travel and exchange (‘transnational contacts’): We propose to establish the Euro-
pean Waltz program for employees. 
4) Tackle economic inequality for EU participation: We suggest to establish a Citizens’ As-
sembly at the EU level. The Assembly would gather people from all regions and socio-
economic backgrounds and might, thereby, allow for a much broader assessment of perspec-
tives on a political issue. Moreover, we took constrained personal financial means into ac-
count for the Pensioners’ Erasmus and the European Waltz program. 
5) Foster reliability, citizenship, and similarity: In order to increase the civic aspect of Europe-
an identity we present the currently highly debated proposal to establish EU-wide transna-
tional party lists and a proposal to establish EU consular offices. 
Finally, we gathered existing and suggested own proposals in order to respond to the above-
mentioned areas of action. In specific, we discussed the proposal to establish transnational party 
lists, an EU Citizens’ Assembly, and EU consular offices, and proposed to establish an EU public ser-
vice broadcaster, a Pensioners’ Erasmus scheme, and a ‘European Waltz’ program. In our view, all 
these intriguing proposals could each help to increase either the civic or cultural component of Euro-
pean identity and, thereby, provide for a smooth European integration. 
As said at the very beginning, we do not intend to ‘nudge’ people towards emotional EU appraisal, 
instead our proposals seek to stimulate democratic debate and fruitful exchange between EU citi-
zens. The multi-crisis of European integration over the last decade has called politicians to care about 
European identity. In contrast, though, to what has been engaged in, our analysis shows that it is less 
‘cosmetics’ in terms of the EU’s image or citizens’ participation that seems promising, but instead 
fostering proper controversial democratic debates and bringing people into exchange with each oth-
er, into traveling and learning. ’European identity’ is popularly discussed as the missing piece to Eu-
ropean unification. However, ‘European identity’ cannot be prescribed, but, as our research shows, 
has to be experienced. The proposals that we presented above could be a first step into discussing 
and implementing this in a more comprehensive way. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A – Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean SD Min Max Frequency Percentage 
European Identity 0.599 0.490 0 1   
Age 51.31 18.24 15 99   
Occupation – employed     15,249 54.45 
     Occupation – retired     9,024 32.22 
     Occupation – self-employed    1,942 6.93 
     Occupation – student     1,674 5.98 
     Occupation – unemployed    118 0.42 
Student 0.060 0.237 0 1   
Retired 0.322 0.467 0 1   
Female 0.555 0.497 0 1   
Own socio-economic 
situation (=good) 
0.690 0.463 0 1   
Education 13.94 3.62 0 25   
Children 0.369 0.482 0 1   
Multiple nationalities 0.013 0.114 0 1   
Intra-EU migrant 0.024 0.152 0 1   
Knowledge 1.688 0.888 0 3   
Discuss 0.843 0.664 0 2   
Travelling 0.689 0.796 0 2   
Exchange 0.841 0.877 0 2   
Altruism 0.469 0.499 0 1   
Optimism 0.502 1.278 -2 2   
Regional Attachment 1.360 0.939 -2 2   
Country's economic situa-
tion (=good) 
0.472 0.499 0 1   
Political Spectrum – middle    24,020 85.76 
     Political Spectrum – extreme Left    2,210 7.89 
     Political Spectrum – extreme Right    1,777 6.34 
EU purpose – other     5,355 19.12 
     EU purpose – culture     9,570 34.17 
     EU purpose – economics    10,773 38.47 
     EU purpose – rule of Law    2,309 8.24 
EU people share values 0.132 1.124 -2 2   
More EU integration 0.102 1.304 -2 2   
EU support -0.124 0.866 -1 1   
Relative trust in EU (vs. nat. 
government) 
0.190 1.052 -2 2   
Relative satisfaction with EU  
(vs. nat.) democracy 
-0.020 1.194 -4 4   
EU threat to own culture 0.129 0.335 0 1   
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Unemployment rate 1.424 1.157 0 3   
EU Budget net contribution -0.288 1.700 -2 2   
KOF Globalization index 1.404 1.105 0 3   
Country group size – small    10,627 37.94 
     Country group size – medium    10,282 36.71 
     Country group size – large    7,098 25.34 
New member state 0.438 0.496 0 1   
EU Budget net payer 0.396 0.489 0 1   
Country group geo – core    6,183 22.08 
     Country group geo – east    11,256 40.19 
     Country group geo – Scandinavia & north   5,416 19.34 
     Country group geo – south    5,152 18.40 
Observations 28,007      
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